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Executive Summary 
One of the UK’s great achievements is that people are increasingly living longer.  One consequence is that the 
number of older people in society is increasing steadily as a proportion of the working age population. In addition 
to this the ‘total support ratio’, the ratio of the number of workers to the number of both young and old people, 
peaked in 2007 and is now in decline. 
The signiﬁ cance of this is that a high total support ratio is often associated with periods of rapid economic growth 
as has occurred in the UK over the last decade or so, and which has also occurred, but on a much greater scale, in 
Asian economies such has China, India and Korea. 
In Japan, the ﬁ rst Asian country to develop economically after the war and currently the most advanced ageing 
country in the world, the total support ratio peaked some time ago and its economy has been relatively static 
since. 
In the light of these demographic facts this report investigates the economic challenges of an ageing UK 
population and considers it to be at a demographic crossroad. It estimates the potential downside of getting 
outcomes ‘wrong’ i.e. doing nothing based on current trajectories, but it also estimates the potential economic 
upside of getting outcomes ‘right’. 
Unusually for studies of this kind it focuses on three kinds of expectancy to build its case: life expectancy, healthy 
life expectancy and working life expectancy. It shows that a change in any one of these has important economic 
implications. For example it ﬁ nds that if extra years are not being spent in good health, there are consequent 
implications for the cost of health and social care, pensions and social security beneﬁ ts, and hence taxes.  
Using a simple economic model the report shows that a passive ageing scenario based on current trends could 
bring economic problems in terms of higher taxes and falling standards of living, especially if long-term increases 
in wage productivity are not maintained.  The worst case is that both GDP and GDP per capita could fall; the best 
case is that both could rise but for this to happen certain conditions need to be met.
One condition is that people need to work for longer. One way to achieve this is to increase state pension age 
but success is not guaranteed since pension age is no longer a reliable indicator of when people cease economic 
activity. For example a key ﬁ nding is that labour participation rates drop signiﬁ cantly after age ﬁ fty, long before 
normal pension age. 
The report ﬁ nds that those with the longest working life expectancy at age 50 are more educated, home owners, 
married or co-habiting and in reasonable health. By contrast, reasons for economic inactivity in the 50+ age range 
include poor health and increased caring responsibilities (e.g. staying at home to look after older relatives or sick 
partners).
Another condition is for healthy life expectancy to increase concomitantly with life expectancy. If it does not 
there is a danger that healthy people of working age could eventually become a scarce commodity and therefore 
another barrier for the UK to contend with. 
A failure to meet either of these conditions could also lead to a signiﬁ cant increase in the amount of replacement 
migrant labour coming into the UK in the next decades. The population is already projected to increase to 70m by 
2025 but could easily be between 8m and 14m higher as this report shows, depending on one’s assumptions. 
One obstacle to extending working life expectancy is the large number of people, almost 3m, on long-term 
sick and disability beneﬁ ts. It can be shown that the numbers involved are correlated with poor health and are 
therefore genuine to a degree, but physical health is not the only barrier to work as it was when the UK was 
predominantly a manufacturing economy with a large heavy industry sector. 
Signiﬁ cantly, the reasons for claiming beneﬁ ts is changing; whereas claimants were more likely in the past to 
be suffering from occupational related conditions, more claimants today receiving beneﬁ ts have some form of 
mental illness or ofﬁ ce related work conditions such as a bad back. 
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Part of the reasons for the large numbers on beneﬁ ts relates to poor work incentives. A problem is that average 
earnings peak when a person is in their 40s and beneﬁ t replacement rates are quite high for large numbers in the 
50+ age group who qualify for the relevant social security beneﬁ ts. 
The evidence for pursuing an alternative more healthy or active ‘ageing trajectory’ is compelling. If increases in 
healthy life expectancy and working life expectancy are able to keep pace with life expectancy, the future looks 
brighter and quantiﬁ ed estimates of the difference this could make are given. However, the analysis begs the 
question of what actions need to be followed in order to ensure that it will happen as conjectured. 
The report ﬁ nds that whilst much effort is being made to improve health through important prevention and 
educational programmes, the evidence for cost effectiveness is currently weak and needs to improve, partly since 
payoffs are long-term and uncertain (e.g. action on childhood obesity, heart disease, alcohol consumption, food 
additives, smoking cessation). 
An alternative option for improving health would be to increase spending on healthcare (and there is always 
public pressure to do this), but data from around the world suggest that the impact could be negligible due to 
diminishing returns to health improvement at current levels of spending. 
For example, the report suggests that a complete cessation of smoking would yield a far greater increase in 
healthy life expectancy and economic beneﬁ ts than a 50% increase in healthcare spending (approximately 
£50bn a year). 
A further alternative is to reduce inequalities in society since this is also associated with improved health and 
longevity. International examples of the impact this could have are given. 
However, more work is needed to unpick these issues to establish what works best for the UK and what is cost 
effective from a strategic perspective of life/health/work balance.  
Since each of the expectancies in the model presented in the paper (life/health/work) move gradually relative 
to their economic effects on national income, it is important to ensure that the UK moves along an ‘active’ path 
through the period of accelerated ageing rather than a ‘passive’ path that could result in economic stagnation.  
For example, male and female labour participation rates have been under 65% for years but only a 2% increase/
decrease in labour participation rates equates to 1 year increase/decrease in working life expectancy. This alone 
would make a signiﬁ cant difference to economic prospects.
Overall the ﬁ ndings indicate the need for greater linkages between policies so that changes in longevity or one 
of the other expectancies – crudely increasing longevity by one year - should be matched by changes in pension 
age, pension and beneﬁ t values, participation rates or healthy life expectancy. 
Finally, in the current recession there is a danger that the hard fought gains in the labour market since the 
previous recession will be lost and that damage of previous cycles could be repeated, and so it is even more 
important to have a co-ordinated strategy.
May 2009
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1 
Introduction
3 Foresight Mental Capital and Wellbeing Project (2008). Final Project report – Executive Summary. The Government Ofﬁ ce for Science, London.
4 Working for a healthier tomorrow (2008) Dame Carol Black, TSO, London.
5 MacKellar,L. Ermoliieva, T., Horlacher, D. and Mayhew, L. (2004)The economic impacts of population ageing in Japan. ESRI studies on Ageing, 
Edward Elgar.
6  The total support ratio, which is the ratio for the number of people aged 20 to 64 to the population <20 plus population 65+, peaked in 2007 after a 
steady rise for over 27 years.
One of great success stories in the UK is that people 
are living longer. Life expectancy at birth is now 
almost 80 years, having advanced 11 years since 
1950 thanks to improvements in occupational 
health, health care, fewer accidents, and higher 
standards of living.  This success in turn presents a 
huge opportunity for individuals if extra years are 
spent in prosperity and good health. As a recent 
Foresight report has demonstrated3, tapping into 
the experience and skills of older adults can also 
beneﬁ t employers, public services and voluntary 
and civic organisations. 
Indeed, realising the full potential of older citizens 
of the UK will be central to the Government’s 
response to changing economic circumstances and 
the drive to build a strong, fair economy for the 
twenty-ﬁ rst century. However, the challenges posed 
by an ageing society do not rest solely with older 
citizens. Referring to the high levels of economic 
inactivity, the Black report (2008)4 noted: “The sheer 
scale of people on incapacity beneﬁ ts represents 
an historical failure of healthcare and employment 
support to address the needs of the working age 
population in Britain”. In other words the health of 
the working age population is needed to sustain the 
economy of the whole population and this must not 
be overlooked as it is part of the solution. 
Studies on population ageing usually take one of 
three forms: analysis of macro economic problems 
relating to the decline in the workforce; analysis of 
social security systems; and thirdly labour market 
studies, many focussing on older workers (Mackellar 
et al, 2004)5. In this paper, we tackle similar issues 
but do so from a health perspective. The hypothesis 
is that as a population ages health tends to 
deteriorate thus creating problems for the economy 
and so good health becomes a scarcer commodity 
leading to increased healthcare costs, high social 
security beneﬁ ts and lost economic output.  Hence 
it is important to quantify these effects and compare 
them with strategies that maintain or improve 
health.
The extent to which this will apply to the UK is 
additionally important for the following reasons. The 
UK is going though a very rapid period of population 
growth from around 55.9m in 1908 to a projected 
71m by 2030.  Over the same period the structure 
of the population will alter signiﬁ cantly with the 
population aged 65+, doubling from 8m in 1980 to 
16m by 2030.  The ratio of people aged 20-64 to 
65+ was 3.7 in 2008, much the same as in 1980, but 
from now onwards it is due to go into rapid decline 
reaching 2.5 by 2030 as the population enters an 
era of unprecedented ageing. In addition to this, the 
UK total support ratio which is often associated with 
the rapid economic ascendancy of countries like 
Japan peaked in 2007(see Annex A)6. The rise up to 
2007 is the result of falling fertility and the decline 
after 2007 is caused by the progressive retirement 
of baby boomers.
An explanation for such demographic transitions is 
as follows. Initially fertility is high and accompanied 
by low child support ratios (i.e. a small ratio of 
adults to children) as occurred after the war. With 
demographic transition, the proportion of working 
age population to total population increases, 
favouring labour supply and improved savings 
rates. The ﬂ ipside occurs when fertility falls and the 
population ages and so that the low child support 
ratio gradually transforms into a low old age support 
ratio. 
In between the total support ratio or TSR (the total 
working age population to the young plus old 
population) peaks and then declines, albeit along 
a slow glide path and so the demographic cycle 
is complete.  It follows that the favourable labour 
market conditions created by the rise in the TSR 
needs to be replaced by other factors, such as full 
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employment and improved education and health 
levels in order to maintain economic growth7. 
The UK transition is on a smaller scale and lagging 
behind Japan by about 15 years but the potential 
consequences are no different. One obvious 
consequence is pressure to increase pension age. 
To maintain the old age support ratio at today’s 
level of 3.7, UK state pension age would need to 
increase to 65.5 years in 2020, 66.5 years in 2025 
and 67.5 years by 20308 (see Annex B).  Built into 
this reckoning are assumptions that people will 
work longer and be more productive, because 
the alternative is that taxes will have to rise or the 
working age population would need to be bolstered 
through higher levels of migration rather than 
increased fertility.
The danger to economic growth is that historical 
trends in wage productivity will slow or stagnate 
for the following reason.  Analysis shows that 
average earnings track changes in the 35-49 age 
groups, at which point earnings peak and that in 
50+ age groups earnings decline. It is debateable 
whether the trend will be as mechanistic as this in 
the future, as the over 50s may have skills that are 
valued compared to today’s over 50s. Nevertheless 
a demographic shift could render the possibility of 
stagnant wages a real possibility9. 
Growth will be determined by whether productivity 
of older workers is lower; or whether older workers 
provide an adequate replacement for younger 
workers. Labour competes in a global economy 
and ﬁ rms can source their production in countries 
with a plentiful supply of low cost labour. Much will 
depend on the nature of the work and on skills e.g. 
old economy workers are ‘burnt out’ at an earlier 
age than knowledge workers in the ‘new’ economy 
(see Blake and Mayhew, 2007)10. Recent evidence 
for the degree of shift in age related earnings are 
given in Annex L. However, there are dangers lurking 
behind these simple assumptions which depend 
crucially on extra years spent in work being healthy 
years as well as on continued economic growth. 
A pessimistic scenario is that an ageing population 
will simply increase the stock of unhealthy people 
resulting in lower productivity and more people 
7 E.g.  see Demographic Transition and Economic Growth in China (2006). Cai Fang and Wang Dewen, Institute of Population and Labour Economics 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, wangdw@cass.org.cn
8 Current state pension age for men is 65 and for women 60. Pension age for women is due to be harmonised with men at age 65 from 2020. Further 
increases are not envisaged until after 2030 (see Pension Commission Report).
9 Overcoming the Barriers and Seizing the Opportunities for Active Ageing (2005) The Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research in the Social 
Sciences, on behalf of the European Union (contract No: HPSE-CT-2001-000102)
10 Blake and Mayhew (2006)  On the sustainability of the UK state pension system in the light of population ageing and declining fertility. The Economic 
Journal, 116 (June), f286–f305.
under care. Poor health is not conﬁ ned to older age 
groups and a signiﬁ cant number of working age 
adults are economically inactive due to long-term 
sickness and disability. Based on measures reported 
in this paper today there are 5.1 healthy adults aged 
20+ for every unhealthy adult; by 2025 this could 
fall to 4.3 to 1 due to ageing.  
To put this in perspective, there would either need 
to be an increase of 8m in the number of healthy 
adults in order to maintain the current balance, 
or healthy life expectancy at age 20 would need 
to increase by about 3.5 years given the expected 
increases in life expectancy (Annex C). Were we only 
to include healthy people below state pension age 
in this calculation we would ﬁ nd that increasing 
pension age would not be able to restore the 
level to 2007 levels since we would soon run out 
of healthy people! On the other hand this might 
be possible if there were only reasonable health 
improvements at every age in which case state 
pension age could be held at 68.
Of the £250bn the UK spends each year on 
healthcare, social security beneﬁ ts and social care, 
about £30bn is spent on beneﬁ ts for the long-term 
sick and disabled, and £20bn on social care. The 
share spent on healthcare for the long-term sick and 
disabled is harder to calculate but is somewhere 
in the region of £40bn.  These ﬁ gures suggest that 
average annual public expenditure on the estimated 
7.3m long-term sick and disabled adults is around 
£10,000 to £13,000 per person per year depending 
on one’s assumptions. 
Social security beneﬁ ts must be paid for through 
taxes or out of pocket expenditure. Beneﬁ ts paid in 
kind such as caring activities are generally paid for 
by foregone wages and economic output depending 
on the age of the carer. If this already sizeable 
problem could be tackled by health improvements, 
it may be possible to redress some of the balance 
in these support ratios, at least in part. This 
requires both a more detailed understanding of the 
demographic trends in health, coupled with work 
and also some means of quantifying the scale that 
different health improvements and interventions 
could make to the equation.
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A difﬁ culty is that there are numerous measures 
and deﬁ nitions of health and so what we mean by 
ill health or disability is, to a considerable extent, 
arbitrary. We use terms such as morbidity, physical 
disability, self reported health, or beneﬁ t eligibility 
interchangeably.  For reasons explained later, the 
main measure of health used here corresponds to 
a person that would qualify for one or more of the 
current sick and disability beneﬁ ts depending on 
severity, but other measures and deﬁ nitions are also 
employed (e.g. to enable international comparison, 
or with reference to morbidity rather than physical 
disability). Based on beneﬁ t eligibility, there are 
2.8m adults that fall into our deﬁ nition aged 20-64 
and 4.5m aged 65+. Based on the age proﬁ les of 
current claimants the equivalent ﬁ gures in 2025 will 
be 3.1m and 6.6m.
With the sharp downturn in the old age support 
ratio and the rapidly expanding number of older 
people, the evidence suggests that we are on the 
threshold of a new era in UK history that is set to 
continue for the foreseeable future. The next 15 
to 20 years provide the window of opportunity for 
putting in place the necessary policies and systems 
to support them. This paper is concerned with 
explaining these trends in some detail to provide: 
• Estimates of the potential downside of getting 
outcomes wrong/ doing nothing based on 
current trajectories; 
• Estimates of the potential economic upside 
of getting outcomes in later life right, with a 
focus on better health and greater participation 
(healthy, active ageing).
As is developed further below, the paper builds on 
and analyses three key quantities: life expectancy 
(LE), healthy life expectancy (HLE) and working 
life expectancy (WLE). Various hypotheses follow 
from changes in these quantities. For example a 
‘downside’ scenario could be further rises in LE but 
no corresponding increases in HLE or WLE.  This 
could signiﬁ cantly increase the health burden with 
corresponding falls in living standards and a rise in 
population due to increased demand for migrant 
labour. An ‘upside’ hypothesis, which we call the 
‘active ageing’ scenario, would result in a narrowing 
in the gap in LE and HLE and increases in WLE. 
This would result in improved living standards and 
alleviate migration pressures.
11 Rickayzen, B. and Walsh (2002),  A multi state model of disability for the UK: implications for need for long-term care for the elderly.  British Actuarial 
Journal,8, II, pp. 341-392.
12 ELSA -English Longitudinal Study of Ageing http://www.ifs.org.uk/elsa/index.php
Many important questions relate to these measures 
and the differences between them. For example, 
what does closing the gap between life expectancy 
and health expectancy by 2 years and extending 
labour participation rates beyond state pension 
age do for government expenditure/revenue and 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (the so-called 
healthy ‘active ageing scenario’)? Alternatively what 
does widening the life and health expectancy gap 
and holding labour participation rates constant 
do for government expenditure/revenue and GDP 
growth (the unhealthy, ‘passive ageing scenario’)? 
The answers to such questions for the UK are 
crucial if the aim is to continue to increase GDP in 
a globally competitive world, but also to maintain 
or increase living standards (since the two are not 
necessarily the same thing). By the arguments 
put forward in this paper these objectives can be 
achieved by different means, but not all equally 
desirable: for example, (i) by simply allowing the 
population to grow unrestrained; or (ii) by pursuing 
a more orderly approach in which the full potential 
of the population is realised through better health 
and economic engagement. 
We begin with a description of the general approach 
adopted and the necessary deﬁ nitions, with 
illustrations of how well the UK compares with other 
countries on different measures of life and health 
expectancy. We then describe a simple model which 
predicts how the economy could behave based on 
different assumptions about life expectancy, health 
and working life expectancy. Scenarios presented 
use realistic assumptions informed by statistical 
trends in the input variables. 
To do this we make use of different data sources. 
The ﬁ rst is the Rickayzen and Walsh disability 
model11 which provides us with age and gender 
speciﬁ c disability prevalence rates from age 
20 by severity including projections based on 
different health scenarios; the second is the British 
Household Panel survey which we use to investigate 
life expectancy and healthy life expectancy from age 
50 based on different socio-economic groups; and 
third is the ELSA12 which we use to measure work 
participation levels from age 50 and the inﬂ uence of 
various socio-economic factors on their levels.
The Rickayzen and Walsh model is useful for 
quantifying capability for work and beneﬁ t 
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entitlement. It uses a scale of 0 (healthy) to 10 
(severely disabled) and produces estimates of 
the population in each category. Of particular 
interest for the purposes of this paper is that a 
score of 1+ on the disability scale correlates almost 
perfectly with the main working age disability 
beneﬁ ts, namely Incapacity Beneﬁ t, Disability Living 
Allowance or both (Annex F).  Similarly persons 
scoring 6+ on the disability scale correlates with the 
number of people on post-65 disability beneﬁ ts, 
namely Disability Living Allowance or Attendance 
Allowance. 
In the real world the economy could be easily over- 
whelmed by other economic factors unrelated to 
demography, but ignoring demography would leave 
too much to chance. A key advantage of the 
simplistic approach taken is that it is possible to 
isolate the variables that support the general 
argument and draw simple conclusions. Based on 
the model, we show how changes to LE, HLE, WLE 
could affect various areas of government 
expenditure, taxes and GDP. We use the model to 
consider the changes needed to put the UK economy 
on an ‘active aging path’ in simplistic terms.
Background to health, work and life 
expectancy
There is no single source of data on LE or HLE that 
serves all purposes. Life expectancy is the average 
number of years of life remaining at a given age. 
Health expectancy is a generic term for any of a 
number of summary measures which use explicit 
weights to combine health expectancies for a set of 
discrete health states into a single indicator of the 
expectation of equivalent years of good health at a 
given age13.
To make our arguments, we begin by comparing the 
UK on a range of published measures. These include 
the World Health Organisation (WHO), the ONS and 
the Human Mortality Database. Clearly our analysis 
needs to be more ﬂ exible and detailed than these 
data can provide. For example, we are interested 
in measuring life expectancy and healthy life 
expectancy at different ages and not just at birth, 
and we would like to be able to disaggregate these 
quantities into the experiences of different socio-
economic groups and lifestyles. 
13 Disability-free life expectancy measures disability by looking at reported limitations in day to day activities such as work. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) deﬁ nes a quantity known as HALE (health adjusted life expectancy). This is the average number of years that a person can 
expect to live in full health. HALE is calculated by subtracting from the life expectancy the average number of years in ill-health weighted for severity 
of the health problem. The ﬁ rst example of ‘health expectancy’ was published in a report of the US Department of Health Education and Welfare 
(Sullivan, 1971).
14 Fries, J.F. 1980 Aging, natural death, and the compression of morbidity. New England Journal of Medicine,  N Engl J Med. 303(3):130-5.
We combine these measures to analyse the general 
effects of an ageing population on the UK economy 
of trends and changes in their relative values over 
time. In order to produce the insights we need, we 
use a simple uncluttered framework combining key 
variables rather than attempt to model the whole 
economy in detail. Hence LE is important because 
it affects how people plan their lives and spend 
their time, for example whether to invest for longer 
in education to save or to consume. A high HLE 
creates the necessary conditions for any economic 
activity to be undertaken and inﬂ uences the 
decision to remain economically active for longer 
and thus increase WLE. Higher WLE is associated 
with economic growth, investment in research and 
development and improved quality of life. 
LE is greater than HLE which in turn is greater 
than WLE. The ﬁ rst must be true and the second is 
generally true. The difference between LE and HLE 
can be interpreted as the number of years spent in 
ill health and disability (usually, but not exclusively 
at the end of life). The difference between HLE 
and WLE can be regarded as the healthy years 
spent in economic inactivity (broadly leisure, in 
retirement, caring, house keeping and education). 
From a societal point of view WLE can be thought 
of as being constrained by three factors: years in 
education, years spent in caring activities on behalf 
of others (mainly children and older people), and 
by law (e.g. minimum or maximum ages in the work 
force). 
Healthy individuals are generally more productive 
than unhealthy ones and are more ﬂ exible in terms 
of the work they do and thus ﬁ nding employment. 
A low HLE may conﬂ ict with a policy of ‘active 
ageing’ if it results in early withdrawal from 
economic activity ahead of pension age, and if HLE 
is less than pension age then a person may require 
ﬁ nancial support through the beneﬁ ts system (i.e. 
disability beneﬁ ts).  The lesser the gap between LE 
and HLE, the lower is the prevalence of disability 
and ill health in society, whereas the greater the 
gap the more people will be dependent on health 
and social care and the more healthy people will 
be diverted into caring activities. Closure of the gap 
is also termed the ‘compression of morbidity’ and 
means that illness is compressed into a smaller 
number of years over the life cycle14. 
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A country which scores badly on any of these 
indicators in which the gap between any of them 
is excessively large, will therefore tend to suffer 
economically through low growth, productivity 
and potentially higher taxes. There is evidence 
of a strong impact of increased LE on economic 
performance, namely that increases in GDP 
per capita are associated with increases in life 
expectancy. The ﬁ nding that LE increases with 
income, albeit at a diminishing rate, seems to 
hold regardless of whether studied at the global, 
national, community or individual level; but it also 
holds across demographic groups and in different 
economic contexts. This seems highly intuitive 
as life extension occurs at a diminishing rate and 
usually each extension costs more than the previous 
one. One question that arises is if improvements in 
LE were equally shared overall, would LE increase at 
a faster rate? It seems plausible that it would since 
potential gains in LE for those at the top of the LE 
tree are likely to be smaller than for those at the 
bottom.  
It has been suggested that income inequalities 
could also have a direct impact on individual 
health and therefore LE (Kawachi et al. 1997)15. 
Hence, the observed correlation between LE and 
income inequality could be the result of diminishing 
returns or an actual causal effect, and in this regard 
several mechanisms have been proposed. It is 
argued, for example, that societies with sharper 
inequalities tend also to suffer from a lower level 
of social capital and mutual trust, which in turn 
might be detrimental to health. Due to the lack of 
social cohesion, individuals are exposed to higher 
crime or accident rates, which have a direct impact 
on health. Finally, unequal communities tend to 
be more polarized and might, as a result provide 
unequal access to public services (Arujo et al., 
2008; Krugman, 1996; Zhao, 2006)16. 
Karlsson in an unpublished paper17 has studied 
the relative effects that a difference in absolute 
income would make compared with a reduction 
in income inequality. He found for example that a 
$1,000 increase in the GDP per capita in the UK (at 
$29,462 in 2004, the latest year in the international 
15 Kawachi I., B. P. Kennedy, K. Lochner and D. Prothrow-Stith (1997), Social capital, income inequality, and mortality, American Journal of Public Health; 
87:1491-1498
16 Araujo, M.C.; Ferreira, F.H.G.; Lanjouw, P. and Ozler, B. (2008), Local inequality and project choice: Theory and evidence from Ecuador, Journal of 
Public Economics, 92 (5-6): 1022-1046 ; Krugman, P. (1996). The Spiral of Inequality. Mother Jones (November/December): 44-49; Zhao, Z. (2006), 
Income Inequality, Unequal Healthcare Access, and Mortality in China., Population and Development Review; 32(3): 461-83.
17 Life Expectancy, GDP and Inequality (personal communication)
18 The Gini coefﬁ cient is a measure of statistical dispersion ranging in value from 0 to 1 and is used as a measure of income or wealth inequality. A value 
of zero corresponds to perfect equality (everyone having exactly the same income) and 1 to perfect inequality (where one person has all the income, 
while everyone else has zero income). Worldwide, Gini coefﬁ cients range from approximately 0.232 in Denmark to 0.707 in Namibia. More advanced 
economies tend to have a Gini coefﬁ cient of between 0.25 and 0.50.
dataset used) would have bought 0.11 additional 
life years. This ﬁ gure could be compared with the 
estimated effect of a similar increase in India (GDP 
per capita $3,213) where the same increase in 
GDP would buy an additional life year. Similarly, 
reducing the UK income inequalities as measured 
by the Gini coefﬁ cient18 (currently 0.32) to the 
lowest level recorded in 2004 (Sweden, 0.23) would 
increase life expectancy by 0.16 years. He notes that 
eliminating inequalities altogether would increase 
life expectancy by another 0.41 years provided 
the assumption of a linear effect for all levels of 
inequalities is correct.
Interestingly he points out that even though 
the inequality effect might appear to be more 
important than the absolute income effect, real 
increases in GDP of this magnitude occur in a 
much shorter space of time than it would take to 
reduce inequalities to achieve a similar result. He 
goes on to show that GDP per capita also produces 
similar effects on HLE, so implying that identical 
arguments will apply to HLE as apply to LE. This is 
important since it has been argued that ﬁ ndings of 
an association between inequality and health could 
be attributable to ‘reverse causality’ i.e. policies 
which improve health or educational attainment 
amongst the poor are also likely to reduce income 
inequalities. 
The gap between life expectancy and 
healthy life expectancy
In international comparative terms UK LE and HLE 
is up with other developed countries as one might 
expect but it is not in the vanguard. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) for example shows 
that the gap between LE and HLE for different 
life expectancies at birth is more or less constant 
regardless of life expectancy and that the average 
years spent in poor health is equivalent to 10 
years of life at birth. In developing countries with 
a low life expectancy a far greater proportion of 
life is therefore spent in ill health and disability 
than in more developed countries. For developing 
countries, low life expectancy and ill health tend to 
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be related to infectious diseases and in developed 
countries to the chronic diseases of older age.  
Based on the concept of HALE (Health Adjusted Life 
Expectancy ~ see footnote 13), WHO shows that 
the UK is ahead of the US in HLE and LE but behind 
Japan which has both the highest LE and HLE in the 
world and also the smallest gap between LE and 
HLE. UK LE is 79 years, HLE 71 years (gap 8 years), 
LE in Japan is 82 years, HLE 75 years (gap 7 years) 
and for the US LE is 78 years, and HLE 69 years (gap 
9 years). These data are based on a 2003 snapshot 
and do not therefore show how either LE or HLE are 
changing over time. 
The Ofﬁ ce for National Statistics (ONS) publishes 
statistics on HLE for Great Britain, which it deﬁ nes 
as years of expected life in either good or fairly good 
health (based on general health) or free from long 
standing illness19.  ONS data suggests that whilst 
both LE and HLE are increasing the gap between 
them is widening (Annex E provides further detail). 
Trend analysis of ONS data since 1981shows that: 
• LE at birth will be 83.2 years in 2025 as compared 
with 79.1 years in 2005 (the latest year for which 
data are available), an increase of 4.1 years
• HLE will be 71.7 years at birth in 2025 as 
compared with 69.3 years in 2005 an increase of  
2.4 years
• by 2025 the gap between LE and HLE will be 
11.48 years compared with 9.75 years in 2005 
equivalent to an average change of 28.8 days per 
annum  
If correct, the above in turn implies 87.2% of life 
was spent in good or fairly good health in 2005 as 
compared with 86.2% that will be spent in 2025.
Disability-free life expectancy and disease-
free life expectancy
The ONS uses other deﬁ nitions of health based on 
being free of disability which tend to suggest more 
years are spent in disability though not necessarily 
in poor health. Using the Health Survey for England 
(HSE), Rasulo et al20 compared two variants; one is 
disease-free life expectancy and the other disability 
free-life expectancy for the population aged 16 and 
19 Two types of HLE are routinely calculated from national General Household Survey based on either of the following questions: “Over the last 12 
months would you say your health has been good, fairly good, or not good?” and LE free from limiting long-term illness based on : “Do you have any 
long-standing illness, disability or inﬁ rmity?”. The method used by ONS to derive health expectancy is known as the Sullivan Method (see Sullivan, 
D.F. (1971). A single index of mortality and morbidity. HSMHA Health Reports, 86:347-354.). See also Breakwell and Madhavi (2005) ‘Review of 
sources and methods’. Health Statistics Quarterly, 26.
20 Rasulo D. , L. Mayhew and B. Rickayzen: http://www.uptap.net/project23.html
21 Disability-free life expectancy is deﬁ ned as the average number of years an individual is expected to live free of disability if current patterns of 
mortality and disability continue to apply. Disability deﬁ nitions and measurements are only partly harmonised across countries.
over. The HSE includes questions on the occurrence 
of long-term and limiting long-term illness, and on 
the occurrence of conditions that require medicine 
to be taken regularly. Respondents with a long-
term illness could list up to six illnesses while for 
each prescribed medicine the survey provided the 
corresponding disease under treatment. 
The questions on long-term illness and medicine 
were used to obtain the wider measure of morbidity, 
which was called ‘life expectancy with disease’. 
The question on limiting illness, used for the 
computation of disability life expectancy, was 
included for the ﬁ rst time in 1997 when individuals 
reporting a long-term condition were also asked 
whether this condition was limiting their daily 
activities. Reported diseases and disabilities 
by survey respondents were aggregated into 
categories. These reﬂ ected a combination of 
trauma, chronic and long-term conditions, as well as 
infectious diseases and acute episodes. 
The key results are shown in Table 1 and indicate 
that life expectancy is increasing for both males 
and females but the increase is larger for males, 
and that life expectancy with disease has increased 
more for males than for females. It is particularly 
noteworthy that most of the additional years are 
being spent with non-limiting diseases, which is 
slightly less of the additional years being spent 
with disability and that most additional years are 
being spent with co-morbidity as opposed to a 
single disease. For example, the co-morbidity 
category, ‘cardiovascular, respiratory or other 
chronic diseases, and other acute diseases’, was a 
signiﬁ cant cause for increasing both disabled and 
disease life expectancies.
For some purposes, such as estimating the 
demand for long-term care a more appropriate 
measure is disability-free life expectancy at age 
65.  International comparison shows that the UK 
does less well than competitors in either Japan 
or Germany. According the ONS, disability-free 
life expectancy at age 65 is 10 years, which is an 
improvement over recent years. However, this 
is below levels in Japan, Germany, Netherlands 
or Switzerland which all achieve over 12 years 
(OECD)21.  
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Table 1:  
Life expectancy, disease-free life expectancy and disability-free life expectancy at 16 
in 1998 and 2008 in England
  males   females 
    Difference   Difference
 Category of expectancy 1998 2004 (years) 1998 2004 (years)
A life expectancy 59.7 61.5 1.8 64.5 65.7 1.2
B disease free life expectancy 29.4 29.6 0.2 28.3 28.5 0.2
C disability free life expectancy 44.4 46.1 1.7 46.1 47 0.9
        
D years spent with disease 30.3 31.9 1.6 36.2 37.2 1
E years spent with disability 15.3 15.4 0.1 18.4 18.7 0.3
14
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2
Measuring disability
22 Martin, J., Meltzer, H. & Elliot, D. (1988). OPCS surveys of disability in Great Britain, Report 1, The prevalence of disability among adults. London: 
HMSO. The report gives examples of peoples disabilities at different points on the scale. For example, category 1: a man aged 59, deaf in one ear 
; category 2 a woman aged 71 with angina and eye problems; category 6 a man aged 65 with arthritis in spine and legs, a slight stroke and heart 
condition.
From an analytical standpoint all these measures 
suffer from the same disadvantage, namely that 
they do not relate to anything tangible such as 
whether a person is able to work or not, if a person 
is drawing beneﬁ ts because of disability, and 
what the cost is to the public purse in terms of 
beneﬁ ts, or extra health and social care.  They are 
nonetheless interesting because they all indicate 
that whilst the UK performs well by international 
comparison, some of the evidence points to an 
increasing gap between LE and HLE.
We conclude by noting that variations in deﬁ nitions, 
starting age etc. make it difﬁ cult to compare such 
pieces of evidence on a like for like basis, and so a 
more detailed and analytically rigorous approach 
is needed. The detail required depends on the 
problem being addressed, for example whether 
a person qualiﬁ es for social care or has satisﬁ ed 
beneﬁ t rules to be entitled to for example incapacity 
beneﬁ t, the frequency of use of medical services 
or going into a nursing home. Clearly different 
gradations of health are needed using a scale that 
covers all possible health states and therefore 
needs.
For this purpose we make use of the Rickayzen-
Walsh model of disability (2002). This uses a 
scale of 0 (healthy) to 10 (severely disabled) and 
is based on Activities of Daily Living (ADL) rather 
than speciﬁ c health conditions (the origins of the 
scale on which the model is based lay with an OPCS 
survey of disability of all adults in Great Britain22). 
A failure of one or more ADLs is likely to affect 
ability to work or need for care a requirement for 
healthcare irrespective of the underlying medical 
circumstances or aetiology. The model is useful 
because it recognises different health states that 
may trigger different responses from public services 
depending on the degree of severity. It enables us 
for example, to map beneﬁ ts onto a disability scale 
and then estimate how alterations in disability over 
time might affect the number of people on beneﬁ ts 
or to estimate the approximate demand for adult 
social care.
The model projects the future numbers of people 
in different disability states for males and females 
based on current UK population projections so 
we can estimate key indicators such as the ratio 
of healthy to unhealthy people as well as health 
expectancies. We use a so-called  ‘pessimistic 
scenario’ based on the continuation of age speciﬁ c 
disability prevalence rates (scenario A) and another 
more optimistic projection  called the ‘1 in 10’ 
(scenario O). This corresponds to improvements 
in HLE of one extra year every 10 years so that a 
person age x +1 at time t+10 would have the health 
of someone age x at time t. 
According to the model, disability prevalence rates 
in the population increase exponentially with 
age as shown in Figure 1. This graph is for any 
disability scoring 1+ on the disability scale. At age 
65 the rate is 24% (point A) and at age 80, 55% 
(point B) i.e. more than doubled. The rates do not 
differ substantially between males and females 
although the stock of females disabled is higher 
because females live longer and spend more years 
in disability than males.  The signiﬁ cance of ‘1+’ 
correlates highly with working age disability beneﬁ t 
numbers and so one quantity can be proximally 
estimated from the other (see Annex F).
According to interim life tables for 2005 to 2007, 
life expectancy for males and females at age 20 
was 60 years and 63.3 years in 2025 based on a 
continuation of current trends. Table 2(a) shows 
the corresponding values of HLE deﬁ ned for 
different disability states in 2007. It shows that the 
adult disability rate was 16.2% corresponding to 
approximately 9.7 years in disability for a person 
age 20 assuming present rates continue. This in 
turn corresponds to 5.2 ‘healthy’ adults (zero on the 
disability scale) to 1 ‘unhealthy’ adult (1+ on the 
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Figure 1
General relationship between disability prevalence rates and age (source Rickayzen-Walsh model) ~ 
based on scenario A
disability scale). As Table 2(a) recognises, different 
levels of disability are applicable to different 




































Estimates of HLE and disability prevalence rates in 2007 and 2025 with corresponding estimates of 
disability prevalence rates and ratios of healthy to unhealthy adults based on the Rickayzen-Walsh 
model scenario A, 2007 and 2025, and scenario O, 2025
(a) 2007: Life expectancy at 20 equals 60 years (total disabled 7.3m) 
disability scale  HLE %  adult years ratio
cut off (disability free LE) disabled in disability H/U
1 50.2 16.2 9.7 5.2
2 52.1 13.1 7.9 6.6
3 53.3 11.0 6.6 8.1
4 54.5 9.1 5.5 10.0
5 55.6 7.3 4.4 12.7
6 56.7 5.4 3.2 17.6
7 57.6 4.0 2.4 24.1
8 58.4 2.6 1.6 37.2
9 59.0 1.6 1.0 61.2
10 59.6 0.6 0.4 166.9
example people deemed unhealthy scoring 2+ on 
the disability scale the disability rate falls to 13.1% 
and the H/U ratio increases from 5.2:1 to 6.6:1.
Table 2(b) shows that in 2025, by which time the 
population will have aged considerably, the ratios 
become less favourable based on current disability 
prevalence rates (scenario A). Disability will affect 
19% of the adult population based on 1+ on the 
disability scale with an average of 12 years spent in 
disability and a reduction in the H/U ratio from 5.2:1 
to 4.3:1. This occurs because HLE has not advanced 
as fast as LE increasing by 1.1 years as compared 
with 3.3 years in life expectancy. Alternatively if 
there is a ‘1 in 10’ improvement, HLE advances to 53 
years and the disability rate is more or less as it was 
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(b) 2025: Life expectancy at 20 equals 63.3 years (total 9.7m)
disability scale  HLE %  adult years ratio
cut off (disability free LE) disabled in disability H/U
1 51.3 19.0 12.0 4.3
2 53.5 15.5 9.8 5.4
3 55.0 13.1 8.3 6.6
4 56.4 10.9 6.9 8.2
5 57.7 8.9 5.6 10.3
6 59.1 6.7 4.2 14.0
7 60.1 5.0 3.2 18.9
8 61.2 3.4 2.1 28.6
9 62.0 2.1 1.3 46.1
10 62.8 0.8 0.5 124.5
(c) 2025 scenario O (‘1 in 10’ improvement, total 8.1m)
disability scale  HLE %  adult years ratio
cut off (disability free LE) disabled in disability H/U
1 53.0 16.4 10.4 5.1
2 55.0 13.2 8.3 6.6
3 56.4 10.9 6.9 8.2
4 57.8 8.8 5.6 10.4
5 59.0 6.8 4.3 13.7
6 60.3 4.8 3.0 19.9
7 61.2 3.4 2.1 28.5
8 62.0 2.1 1.3 46.4
9 62.6 1.2 0.8 80.6
10 63.1 0.4 0.3 239.6
23  Nuttall, S. R., Blackwood, R. J. L., Bussell, B. M. H., Cliff, J. P., Cornall, M. J., Cowley, A., Gatenby, P. L. & Webber, J. M. (1994). Financing long-term 
care in Great Britain. Journal of Institute of Actuaries, 121, pp 1–53.  The conversion factors are as follows: 1-2 : 5 hours of care per week 
(low requirement); 3-5 : 15 hours per week (moderate requirement);6-8 : 30 hours per week (regular requirement);9-10 : 45 hours per week 
(continuous requirement).
in 2007 and so is the ratio of healthy to unhealthy 
people. This is shown in Table 2(c). 
A key feature of these tables is that disability is 
graded on a scale from least severe (1) to most 
severe (10). A person scoring 10 will need much 
more support than a person scoring one and so 
trigger different responses from relevant services. 
For example Nuttal (1984) used the scale to 
estimate the number of carers required by assigning 
a given number of hours per week depending on 
level of disability23. Applying the same calculations 
here, the implied number of whole time equivalent 
carers in 2007 is 3.3m rising to 4.6m in 2025 based 
on scenario A and 3.6m based on scenario O. These 
ﬁ gures compare with the 2001 Census which found 
there were 4.2m full and part time carers and so 
the estimates seem reasonable. The sensitivity of 
the numbers of people with some form of disability 
to health improvements thus has important 
implications for key areas of public policy, an issue 
to which we now turn.
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3
Impacts on public spending of changing 
demography and health
24 Mayhew, L. (2009)The market potential for privately ﬁ nanced long-term care products in the UK. Actuarial Research Report, No188, Cass Business 
School.
25 Note that from 27 October 2008 Employment and Support Allowance replaced Incapacity Beneﬁ t and Income Support paid on incapacity grounds for 
new customers although will not affect the essence of the analysis presented here..
26 UK state pension age is currently 60 for women and 65 for men. Female state pension age is due to increase in stages from 2010 onwards to 65 by 
2020. For illustrative purposes we use 65 in Figure 2 .
27 IB, SDA, IIB, CA, CTB, IS and HB. Source analysis prepared for the ‘Black Report’ (2008): ‘Working for a Healthier Tomorrow,
28 State pension, Pension Credit, AA and DLA
29 In fact the numbers on these beneﬁ ts are slightly under predicted. The reasons must be speculative but are probably due to administrative factors 
relating to the ﬂ ow onto and off of these beneﬁ ts and beneﬁ ts switches between age 60 and 65 depending on gender.
Before considering broader economic impacts of 
ageing, we consider the direct impacts on three 
major areas of public expenditure which combined 
account for 18% of GDP, and ask the question what 
difference an improvement in health would make to 
expenditure in each. The areas concerned are social 
security beneﬁ ts, social care and health. Between 
them they cover a signiﬁ cant proportion of public 
spending on these three activities, but by no means 
cover all expenditure. They exclude for example 
out of pocket spending on medical insurance and 
private health and long-term care, and also the 
cost of informal care. These substantial elements 
of the picture deserve separate attention, although 
considerations concerning private expenditure on 
long-term care are covered in Mayhew (2008)24. 
(a) Social security 
Total expenditure on social security beneﬁ ts is 
running at £132bn a year or 8.5% of GDP including 
the cost of the state pension. Beneﬁ ts consist of 
universal beneﬁ ts such as Child Beneﬁ t; beneﬁ ts 
based on claimant eligibility such as Disability Living 
Allowance (DLA) and Attendance Allowance (AA); 
contributory beneﬁ ts such as Incapacity Beneﬁ t 
(IB)25; and means-tested beneﬁ ts such as Income 
Support, Council Tax Beneﬁ t and Housing Beneﬁ t. 
State pension age provides a watershed between 
working age beneﬁ ts on the one hand and 
retirement age beneﬁ ts on the other, and so in this 
section we draw the line for analytical purposes at 
age 6526.  Expenditure on long-term sickness and 
disability beneﬁ ts for the working age population 
accounts for £16bn a year (IB, DLA, Severe 
Disablement Allowance, and Industrial Injuries 
Beneﬁ t). This rises to £28.4bn if Carers Allowance 
and means tested beneﬁ ts are included27. For the 
population over state pension age the state pension 
accounts for £67bn a year of which £7bn is Pension 
Credit; disability beneﬁ ts for this age group  (DLA, 
AA) add a further £7bn making £74bn28.  
Life tables compare survival rates, mortality 
rates and life expectancies at different ages 
for a hypothetical population of 100,000 and 
are an important tool used by actuaries and 
demographers. We use survival curves based on 
interim life tables for the UK for 2005-2007 to 
illustrate the segmentation of  the adult population 
from age 20+ into separate social security beneﬁ t 
groups. We are interested here in the three main 
social security beneﬁ ts which deal with long-term 
sickness or disability. These are IB, DLA for the 
under 65s, and AA and DLA for the population over 
65.  
Figure 2, comprising both males and females, is 
split into 5 groups or segments (A to E) depending 
on whether they are over or under state pension 
age and according to the degree of disability on the 
0-10 scale. It turns out that the population under 
65 receiving IB, DLA or both is accurately deﬁ ned by 
the population scoring 1+ on the disability scale29, 
whereas the number receiving beneﬁ ts age 65+ 
is deﬁ ned by the population scoring 6+ on the 
disability scale (see also Annex F).
The groups are as follows:
• A population of working age scoring 1+  on the 
disability scale out of work and claiming long-
term sick and disability beneﬁ ts (2.9m people fall 
into this category). 
• B    population of working age scoring 0 on the 
disability scale and not claiming any long-term 
sick or disability beneﬁ ts (32.6m)
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• C population who are aged 65+ and 6+ on 
the disability scale claiming disability beneﬁ ts 
including Disability Living Allowance and 
Attendance Allowance (1.7m)
• D  population aged 65+ who are between 1 and 
5 on the disability scale and receiving the state 
pension (2.7m)
• E  population aged 65+ scoring 0 on the 
disability scale (healthy) and receiving state 
pension (2.7m)
Factors affecting future spending
(i) Changes in demography and health
With demographic change but no changes to 
underlying disability prevalence rates the effects 
on beneﬁ t numbers are likely to be substantial as 
might be expected. Table 3 shows the number of 
people aged 20+ in different beneﬁ t states in 2007 
and 2025 in which time the population is expected 
to grow along with the number of people of pension 
age. Table 3 shows the expected changes between 
2007 and 2025 with the number scoring 1+ on the 
disability scale expected to increase by 0.3m (<65) 
and 2.2m (65+), assuming a continuation in present 
disability prevalence rates (scenario A). The total 
number scoring zero, i.e. healthy, on the disability 
scale will increase by 2.2m (<65) and 1.9m (65+).  
With health improvements the picture changes 
signiﬁ cantly. The ﬁ gures shown in column C are 
based on scenario O, a 1 in 10 improvement or 
equivalently an increase in HLE of 1 year every 10 
at age 20. The results show more limited increases 
in numbers scoring 1+ or 6+ on the disability scale 
except in the 65+ category due to the much larger 
numbers of people in this age bracket.  Particularly 
noteworthy is the rise in the number of people in 
the zero or healthy state at age 65+ which increases 
by 4m as compared with 1.9m under scenario 
A. This analysis suggests therefore that health 
improvements will be particularly beneﬁ cial to the 
65 + population and could tend to limit the numbers 
in the 6+ on the disability scale which triggers 
Attendance Allowance.
Based on current pension and beneﬁ t rates, and 
ignoring means tested beneﬁ ts, the total cost will 
increase by over a third from around £100bn p.a. to 
£137bn p.a. in 2025.   Most of this increase will be in 
the 65+ age category as a result of increases in the 
numbers on pensions (categories C+D+E) and on 
disability allowances (category C). Note that these 
ﬁ gures exclude proposals to re-link state pension 
to wages from around 2013, which would increase 
this ﬁ gure. If there are health improvements in line 
with scenario O, then increases could be limited 
to £122bn p.a. mainly as a result of changes in the 
 
Figure 2
Survival curve based on UK interim life tables for 2005 – 2007 (based on  Government Actuary’s 
Department [GAD] and Rickayzen-Walsh model). It shows segments of the population (A-E) by 
disability category and beneﬁ t entitlement ~ males and females (see text for segment deﬁ nitions)
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health state of the 65+ but also those of working 
age.
The ability to realise the health improvements 
required is constrained by a number of factors. 
A recent trend is for higher inﬂ ows of claimants 
with mental and behavioural disorders, and lower 
exit rates for this group explains their increasing 
importance within the overall caseload.  For 
example, those with mental and behavioural 
disorders as a primary indicator accounted for over 
40% of the total caseload in 2006 compared to 
26% in 1996.
(ii) Effect of changes in state pension age 
Planned changes to pension age up to 2020 and 
then further changes as proposed by the Pensions 
Commission will result in fewer people qualifying 
for the state pension and for Attendance Allowance 
and more qualifying for Incapacity Beneﬁ t (DLA is 
assumed to be unchanged). Entitlement to means 
tested beneﬁ ts around this age will also occur, 
although harmonisation of state pension age should 
have the effect of simplifying what is a particularly 
complicated area of the social security system due 
to beneﬁ t switches and complex entitlement rules.  
What will be the effects on beneﬁ t expenditure?
We used the disability scale, scenario A and the 
2007 population to estimate the hypothetical 
consequences on social security costs starting at 
a pension age of 60 and increasing it to 70. Table 
4 shows gross and net annual costs of different 
assumed state pension ages on pensions, IB, DLA 
and AA (ignoring consequent changes to means 
tested beneﬁ ts including Income Support, Council 
Table 3
Numbers in different beneﬁ t states aged 20+ in 2007 and 2025 based on scenario A and scenario O
  Col A Col B  Col C
  number of number of  number of
  persons persons  persons
  (millions) (millions) difference (millions) difference
disability disability 2007 2025 (millions) 2025 (millions
category scale ( scenario A) ( scenario A) (colB-colA) (scenario O) (colC-colA)
M&F 20-64 1+ 2.9 3.2 0.3 2.7  -0.1 
M&F 65+ 1+ 4.4 6.6 2.2 5.7  1.2 
under 65+ (M&F) 6+ 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.7  -0.1 
65+ (M&F) 6+ 1.7 2.6 0.9 1.8  0.1 
M&F 20-64 0 32.6 34.7 2.2 35.1  2.6 
M&F 65+ 0 5.1 7.0 1.9 7.9  2.8 
Tax and Housing Beneﬁ t and Pension Credit). The 
major saving is to state pension costs, but there 
are considerable offsets caused by increases in 
entitlement to pre-retirement age long-term sick and 
disability beneﬁ ts. 
This is due to there being larger rises in IB spending 
than a fall in AA spending. It shows for example that 
gross savings in pension costs at an assumed state 
pension age of 70 would be reduced by £5.4bn p.a. 
as a result. IC effectively became an early retirement 
beneﬁ t from the mid 1980s to mid 1990s and so 
how to reduce this tendency is likely to remain a 
key focus of public policy in future years as pension 
age increases (see also Annex G). A similar analysis 
for the population in 2025 shows larger pension 
savings and larger net savings overall due to 
population effects; note that the public spending 
dividend would be higher still if scenario O, health 
improvement, were to be used.
(b) Social and long-term care 
Social care, including long-term care, covers a wide 
range of services provided both by local authorities 
and the independent sector to elderly people either 
in their own homes or in a care home. It also covers 
day centres which help people with daily living. 
Services to help with washing, dressing, feeding or 
assistance in going to the toilet are also included, 
as are meals-on-wheels and home-help for people 
with disabilities but it excludes nursing care i.e. care 
provided by health professionals such as nurses.
Most long-term care consumers are over age 80; 
for example, in England, almost 80 per cent of care 
home inhabitants belong to this age group (Bajekal, 
Table 4
Approximate impact of changes to beneﬁ t expenditure as a result of hypothetical changes in state 
pension age based on the population in 2007
  sick and 
  disability  disability
state  beneﬁ ts pre- beneﬁ ts post total net
pension pensions SPA SPA change
age  (£s bns p.a.) (£s bns p.a.) (£s bns p.a.)  (£s bns p.a.)
60 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
61 -3.4 0.6 -0.2 -2.9
62 -6.6 1.3 -0.3 -5.7
63 -9.8 2.0 -0.5 -8.3
64 -12.8 2.7 -0.6 -10.8
65 -15.6 3.3 -0.8 -13.1
66 -18.1 4.0 -1.0 -15.1
67 -20.8 4.7 -1.1 -17.2
68 -23.4 5.5 -1.3 -19.3
69 -26.0 6.3 -1.5 -21.2
70 -28.5 7.1 -1.7 -23.1
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2002)30. Since increasing life expectancy causes 
this group to grow at a faster rate than the general 
retired population, it is certain that population 
ageing will make the current system of ﬁ nancing 
much more expensive. There is already a trend 
towards concentrating resources only on individuals 
with severe disability (Karlsson et al, 2004)31.  
Currently the UK spends around £19bn a year on 
social care of which £13.4bn (70%) is in institutional 
care and £5.7bn (30%) in home care (about 1.3% 
of GDP). The public sector accounts for 65% of all 
expenditure and the private sector 35%. Of private 
expenditure around 80% is spent on institutional 
care and 20% on home care. To these totals 
should be added the value of informal unpaid 
care by friends and relatives, which is estimated 
to be around £58bn or three times the value of 
formal care32, so that the total cost of social care is 
approximately £77bn a year on this basis.
For our purposes a person who falls into the range 
0-5 on the disability scale does not require long-
term care and if 6+ on the scale is likely to qualify 
for Attendance Allowance. A person between 7 and 
8.5 on the scale is adjudged to have failed 2 ADLs 
30 Bajekal, M. (2002), Care Homes and their Residents, London: The Stationery Ofﬁ ce.
31 Karlsson M., Mayhew, L., Plumb, R and Rickayzen, B. (2006), Future costs for long-term care. Cost projections for long-term care for older people in 
the United Kingdom, Health Policy 75, 187-213
32 Figures compiled from Long-term care for older people (OECD, 2005), the ONS, and from Karlsson et al cited above.
33 Being able to feed and wash and dress oneself, go to the toilet unaided, mobility (e.g. climb stairs) and transfer from bed to chair.   
 34 Dullaway and Elliot, 1998: Long-term care Insurance: A guide to Product Design and pricing. Staple Inn Actuarial Society.
and between 8.5 and 10 is adjudged to have failed 
3+ ADLs, where ADLs are activities of daily living33,34.  
A person with a severe disability is more likely to 
need nursing care than a moderately disabled 
person who could be supported at home. Figure 3 
splits the population so as to identify those who 
score 7+ on the disability scale as follows:
• A  population of working age scoring between   
1 and 6 on the disability scale (5.5m, of whom 
3.1m are 65+)
• B  population of working age scoring 0 on 
the disability scale and not on sick or disability 
beneﬁ ts or in long-term care (37.7m)
• C  population age scoring 7+ on the disability 
scale who have failed 2+ ADLs and are potentially 
receiving some form of long-term care (1.8m, of 
whom 1.3m is 65+)
Table 5 shows the estimated number of disabled 
and severely disabled people aged 65+ in the UK 
in 2007 and 2025 based on the Rickayzen-Walsh 
model and Government Actuary’s Department (GAD) 
population projections. It indicates an increase 
overall of around 58% from 1.3m 2007 to 2m in 
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2025 in moderate to severely disabled people 
aged 65+. 
The important point here is that the long-term 
care market is expected to expand not only for 
institutional care but also for people with moderate 
disabilities. This would imply an increase in formal 
care costs to approximately £30bn from £19bn in 
formal care costs currently. However with health 
improvements under scenario O the increase in the 
number of moderate and severely disabled people 
would be reduced to around 1.7m people and 
associated costs of £23bn.  
Table 5 
Current and projected number of moderate and severely disabled people aged 65+ by sex 
(source: based on Rickayzen-Walsh model)
  2007   2025
  (scenario   (scenario
  A)  A)   
 disability  Males Females  Males Females   %
65+ scale (000s)  (000s) total (000s) (000s) total increase
moderate  7-8.5 199 373 572 350 524 874 52.8
severe  8.5-10 246 467 713 469 687 1156 62.1
total  445 840 1285 819 1211 2030 58.0 
The number of residents in institutions and their 
level of disability is found in the Health Survey 
of England (HSE). The HSE’s deﬁ nition of ‘severe 
disability’ roughly corresponds to Rickayzen-Walsh 
deﬁ nitions of ‘moderate and severe’ combined. 
Karlsson et al35 ﬁ nd that, of the population aged 
65+, around 17.5% of females and 6.5% of males 
are categorized as moderately or severely disabled 
are in nursing homes or residential homes on this 
basis (14% on average). The ﬁ gures in turn imply 
an institutional population of around 125k, 83% of 
whom are female. 
Figure 3 
Survival curve based on UK interim life tables for 2005 – 2007 (source GAD and Rickayzen-Walsh 
model) with segmentation of population in to categories A-C  according to disability and need for 
long-term care ~  males and females (see text for segment deﬁ nitions)
 
35 Future costs for long-term care – cost projections for long-term care for older people in the United Kingdom, cited above.
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Females form a higher percentage because: (a) on 
average females are younger than male spouses/
partners and are commonly the main care providers 
for male partners who become severely disabled 
sooner; (b) females spend longer on average in 
severe disability than males; (c) females have a 
greater propensity to be more severely disabled 
than males; and (d) females live longer than males. 
It is hence the combination of these effects that 
pushes up female numbers in institutional care.
(c) Healthcare
The UK spends over £100bn a year of public 
expenditure on healthcare or about 7% of GDP. The 
long term trajectory for healthcare spending has 
been running at 2% p.a. above GDP growth for many 
years so healthcare is set to increase its share of 
GDP over time. Historically, healthcare consumption 
increases as supply is increased especially where 
healthcare services are free or of low cost. A greater 
part of this growth is due to increased factor costs 
particularly technology and more recently by 
labour costs. The effect of an ageing population is 
smaller but signiﬁ cant since it provides one of the 
catalysts for technological innovation (e.g. such as 
the introduction of dementia drugs, or body part 
replacement).  Unlike social security and social 
care, healthy (short term sick) as well as unhealthy 
(long-term sick) people consume healthcare in large 
quantities.
Healthcare consumption is strongly correlated with 
age and gender with costs increasing exponentially 
with age. However, the additional healthcare 
resources (hospital beds, doctor visits, drugs etc) 
consumed by those with long-term conditions (1+ 
on the disability scale) is not measured explicitly,  
although is estimated to be between 2 and 4 
times the consumption of healthy people (0 in the 
disability scale) per annum. Zweifel36 and others 
have pointed out that proximity to death is a more 
important inﬂ uence on health-care costs than age, 
suggesting that demographic change will not have 
as large an impact on future aggregate health 
expenditure as has been suggested. For illustrative 
purposes we therefore decided to distinguish 
people in their last year of life (about 600k).
We use the disability model to analyse healthcare 
costs by associating people of different ages and 
health status to consumption of healthcare services. 
For this purpose we make use of the Department 
of Health ﬁ gures on average costs of healthcare for 
different age groups plus assumptions about the 
additional costs incurred by sick or disabled people. 
Figure 4 splits the adult population into 5 age 
groups A-E and then subdivides them into 5 further 
groups A’-E’ for those scoring 1+ on the disability 
scale. Category F consists of people in their last year 
of life; it can be shown that this corresponds to 9.5+ 
on the disability scale. This partitioning is now used 
to make crude estimates of how an improvement in 
health could moderate healthcare costs in the future 
versus the alternative of present trends continuing. 
First however, Table 6 estimates the share of 
expenditure by each group A-F in the 20+ age range 
in 2007 based on these assumptions. 
Our aim is to see what might happen with or without 
health improvements in 2025 in order to isolate if 
possible the effect of improving health (all ﬁ gures 
approximate and therefore illustrative). The table 
shows that 37.7m age 20+ account for around 
44.3% of expenditure and 6.8m who score 1-9.5 
on the disability scale account for 22.9%. Group F 
comprising 0.6m people consumes 17.7% and the 
14.7m in the 0-20 age group consume 15.2%. 
For the sake of argument let us assume that 
nominal healthcare expenditure is a function of 
only population size, age and relative health (i.e. we 
ignore impact of technology and real growth). Based 
on projected increases in population, expenditure in 
2025 would be £121bn as compared with £100bn in 
2007 if current health trends are assumed, but with 
health improvements this would reduce to £104bn. 
The main reason is reduced expenditure on people 
scoring 1+ on the disability scale because there will 
be fewer of them in a healthy ageing scenario. 
However, estimating healthcare costs is notoriously 
difﬁ cult, because consumption of healthcare tends 
to reﬂ ect the resources available and not underlying 
need.  So to constrain actual demand to these totals 
would require health improvements in combination 
with supply side adjustments running in parallel. 
More detailed data and research are needed to 
ﬂ esh these arguments out.
36 Zweifely P., S. Felder, and M. Meiers (1999) Ageing of population and healthcare expenditure: a red herring? Health Economics 1991;8(6):485-96
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Figure 4
Survival curve based on UK interim life tables for 2005 – 2007 (source GAD and Rickayzen- Walsh 
model) showing segments of the population (A-F) by disability category and healthcare usage ~ 
males and females. (see text for segment deﬁ nitions)
Table 6
Estimated breakdown of shares in healthcare expenditure by sub-group
   1-9.5 
zero on    on
disability Population % share of disability Population % share of
scale  (millions) expenditure scale (millions) expenditure
A 19.7 26.5 A’ 0.9 4.6
B 12.9 14.1 B’ 1.9 8.2
C 3.4 2.7 C’ 1.5 4.7
D 1.5 0.9 D’ 1.7 3.9
E 0.2 0.1 E’ 0.8 1.5
sub-total 37.7 44.3 sub-total 6.8 22.9
F 0.6 17.7   
0-20 age group 14.7 15.2   
total population 59.7 100.0   
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4
Impact of poor health and increased 
longevity on taxes and the economy – a 
simpliﬁ ed model
The signiﬁ cance of these ﬁ ndings is illustrated 
with the aid of a highly simpliﬁ ed model of the 
economy. The description that follows is intended as 
a framework for investigating the effects on taxes, 
living standards and GDP as a result of changes in 
key quantities, such as life expectancy (LE), healthy 
life expectancy (HLE), working life expectancy 
(WLE) and wage productivity. The aim is to show 
how changes in one variable affect the economic 
variables of interest and scenarios that cause living 
standards and/or GDP or taxes to rise or fall (details 
of the model are included at Annex N).
Consider a situation in society in which the working 
age population crudely divides into one of two 
groups consisting of either healthy or unhealthy 
people.  The unhealthy group do not work and 
receive ﬁ nancial support from the state or they 
are retired and receive a pension plus additional 
ﬁ nancial support for their disability.
The healthy group either work or are economically 
inactive and if they are retired they receive a 
pension. The economically inactive population are 
in caring roles, unpaid work, and full time education 
or simply in leisure.
Without loss of generality we focus on the 
population aged 20+ and deﬁ ne the following 
quantities from age 20: Expected total life, expected 
working life (alive and under state pension age), 
expected retired life (alive and over state pension 
age), expected healthy working life, expected 
healthy retired life.  In this framework healthy life 
expectancy is simply expected healthy retired life 
plus expected healthy working life. 
Variables are introduced for average earnings, 
pension value, and beneﬁ ts rates so that we can 
derive values for taxes, GDP and GDP per capita 
dependent on the values of the quantities above 
for a population, in this case the UK. For simplicity 
we assume that total wages are a proxy for GDP 
(i.e. we ignore investment income, rents etc)37. 
The questions we wish to ask relate to the values 
all these quantities might take. This enables us to 
evaluate the importance of different variables in 
the model such as health and life expectancy and 
to relate them to ﬁ nancial quantities such as wage 
productivity and beneﬁ t rates. 
We contrast situations at two points in time using 
numbers that approximately correspond with 
current experience and at a point in the future 
chosen arbitrarily to be 2025 for illustrative 
purposes. Typical questions would be by how 
much would taxes need to increase if there were an 
increase in life expectancy but no corresponding 
increase in healthy life expectancy, or what would 
be the effect on GDP/capita (a broad measure for 
standard of living) of a health improvement with 
other variables remaining the same?
The scenarios are designed to cover a range of 
possible futures and give graduated improvements 
in GDP/capita. Speciﬁ c values for the quantities 
used in each scenario are given in Annex N. To give 
an example in 2007 the average wage was £23k, 
having grown historically at a real rate of around 2% 
over annum over the long term. The beneﬁ t rate is 
assumed to be £10k and corresponds with the lower 
end of earlier estimates based on current levels of 
beneﬁ t expenditure, health and social care.  The 
state pension is valued at £5k p.a.
Assumed life expectancy, healthy life expectancy, 
and working life expectancy in the base period are 
ﬁ xed at 60, 50, and 42 years38 respectively.  This 
gives a tax rate of 29.4%39 and after tax wage of 
£16.2k, a wage-GDP of £408bn based on the wage 
sum and a GDP/head of £9,077 (Table 7, row 1). 
Now consider the following 6 different scenarios 
based on a 2025 horizon which we compare to the 
baseline case:
37 A full blown demo-economic model would include the whole population, expenditure on defence, education, servicing debt etc and importantly non-
wage GDP.
38  This is an estimate based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS) which shows that male WLE based on being classed as economically active is 39 years and 
females 37 years. If periods of unemployment are included the averages fall to 35 and 33 years respectively.
 39 The average tax rate is based solely on the costs of health and social care, social security beneﬁ ts and state pension.
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1. Health deterioration: Health deteriorates and 
health expectancy falls to 49 years because of fall 
in health in pre-retirement age but life expectancy 
at 20 increases from 60 to 63 so that 14 years of 
life are spent in disability. Participation rates fall to 
63%, and wages fall by 1% p.a.
2.  Passive ageing scenario: Health expectancy 
improves 2 years from baseline, life expectancy 
increases to 63 years. Health gains accrue in pre- 
and post retirement age, years spent in disability 
widens to 11 years. Participation rate increases to 
65% and wage productivity increases by 1% p.a. 
This scenario is seen as a likely scenario based on 
present indications.
3. Health gap unchanged but live longer: Life 
expectancy and healthy life expectancy increase to 
63 and 53 years maintaining a 10-year gap. There 
is a 1% p.a. increase in wage productivity and a 2% 
increase in participation rates to 66%.
4. Health gap closes:  Improvement in health 
expectancy closes gap to 9 years in disability. 
Gains in health expectancy accrue in working age, 
pension age increases by one year. Wages, pensions 
and disability beneﬁ ts increase by 1% p.a. and 
participation rates increase to 67%.
5. Accelerated changes in life expectancy:  Life 
expectancy at 20 increases to 66 years and health 
expectancy to 55 years with 11 years spent in 
disability.  Labour participation rate increases to 
67%, pension age by one year. Wages, pensions 
and beneﬁ ts increase by 1% p.a.
6. Active ageing scenario: Life expectancy at 20 
increases to 66 years and healthy life expectancy 
to 56 years maintaining baseline gap of 10 years in 
disability. Additional healthy years are spent in pre- 
and post retirement; pension age increases by 2 
years. Participation rates increase by 3% and wages, 
pension and beneﬁ t rates by 2% p.a.  
Scenario 6 is described as the ‘active ageing’ 
scenario because it delivers longer life, better 
health and wages but also higher beneﬁ ts for 
disabled people for very little change in tax rates 
as compared with baseline40. The worst case is 
scenario 1 in which life expectancy continues to 
increase but the gap between LE and HLE expands 
by 4 years and participation rates go down. Here 
taxes increase by 15.8%.  Clearly there is a multitude 
of other possible scenarios.
The implied change in tax rates and wages resulting 
from each scenario are given in Table 7 along 
side GDP/capita and wage-GDP. It shows that any 
scenario that involves improvements in health 
relative to life expectancy, increases in participation 
rates, or improvements in wage productivity delivers 
lower taxes and higher net wages, and greater GDP/
capita etc. 
In calculating wage-GDP41 itself the results are 
scaled by the size of the population. The UK’s 
population age 20+ is due to increase from 44.5m 
to 51.4m in the period and the whole population 
from 55.9m to 71.1m.  The 2025 population is used 
in each of the scenarios except for the baseline. 
Four illustrative cases may be contrasted:
Table 7
Scenario results showing implied increases in taxes and changes in wage rates consequent on the 
assumptions given
    partici- average  after tax
scenario  LE HLE   years in pation wage tax wage GDP GDP/
 @ 20 @ 20 disability rate (£000s) rate % (£000s) £ bns capita
base 60 50 10 0.64 23.0 29.0 16.3 408 9,077
1 63 49 14 0.63 19.2 44.8 10.6 355 6,910
2 63 52 11 0.65 27.5 25.2 20.6 555 10,786
3 63 53 10 0.66 27.5 24.2 20.9 563 10,952
4 63 54 9 0.67 27.5 27.8 19.9 572 11,118
5 66 55 11 0.67 27.5 30.1 19.2 560 10,892
6 66 56 10 0.67 32.8 29.5 23.2 669 13,005
40 For a more in-depth  treatment  of the concept of  ‘active ageing’ see for example: ‘Overcoming the Barriers and Seizing the Opportunities for Active 
Ageing Policies in Europe’. ICCR Vienna .http://www.iccr-international.org/activage/en/index.html
41 Gross domestic product (GDP) is the main measure of national income. In economic theory national income equals national expenditure which equals 
national product. Our simpliﬁ ed representation using a proxy based simply on wage income and so ignores other sources of income etc.
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A   As per scenario 1 with more years spent in 
disability. Wage-GDP falls despite expansion in 
population and GDP per capita falls and there 
is decline in participation rates. In other words, 
the wealth of the country and standards of living 
decline.
B   As per scenario 2, the ‘passive ageing 
scenario’, with health improvement at older 
ages and modest wage and participation rate 
improvements. GDP and GDP per capita increase 
and tax rates would be reduced due to lower 
disability beneﬁ t payments. 
C  As per scenarios 3 and 4, improved health,  wage 
productivity and participation rates deliver higher 
GDP and GDP/capita, but beneﬁ t and pension 
increases in scenario 4 reduce after tax wages as 
compared with scenario 3. 
D As per scenarios 5 and 6, signiﬁ cantly improved 
participation rates, and higher wages offset 
cost increases in life expectancy. GDP and GDP/
capita are increased to their highest levels of 
any scenario. Tax rates close to baseline level 
and beneﬁ t and pension rates are signiﬁ cantly 
increased. We call scenario 6 the active ageing 
scenario.
In summary, it must be emphasised that this 
simple model is not a predictive tool and is used 
only for indicative purposes and relies heavily on 
the assumption of a stationary population based 
on ﬁ xed relationships between the variables. A 
more sophisticated model would take into account 
the fact that the variables themselves are not 
independent of one another, so that for example 
average wages are a function of age and working 
life expectancy, and population size a function of 
life expectancy and birth rates. 
A more sophisticated model would take into 
account the whole economy in which case it may be 
possible to show situations in which non-wage-GDP 
could compensate for declines in wage-GDP but this 
needs to be veriﬁ ed in further work. Nevertheless, 
the simple model is a useful tool for summarising 
how demography and the economy are linked, and 
how movements in their values can inﬂ uence key 
economic indicators. 
Variations based on socio-economic 
factors
To prepare for all possible eventualities, policy 
makers need to be able to calibrate social policy 
over the next few decades accordingly, but this 
requires a greater understanding of healthy life 
trajectories and disablement processes based on 
quantities such as LE, HLE and WLE. Currently there 
is no mechanism for quantifying the percentages 
of people that will be unable to work at higher 
retirement ages, whether healthy life expectancy 
as well as life expectancy is increasing, which 
sub-groups are the most vulnerable to sickness 
and disability, the extent to which risk is socially 
rather than biologically determined, and if risk in 
these cases can be manipulated through the policy 
process. 
In this section we consider the implications of a 
index for comparing different types of lives which 
combines health work and life years. This index 
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Thus the index equals one when el equals eh which 
equals e
w
 i.e. LE is the same as HLE and WLE (a 
person works until he/she drops!). HLE is assumed 
to be greater than or equal to WLE so that WLE 
cannot be positive if HLE is zero. The index is 
designed to capture the life time fulﬁ lment and 
contribution of an individual measured in these 
terms. 
A person with a low ratio implies higher health and 
beneﬁ t/pension costs compared with a person 
with a high ratio concentrated into the same life 
span. It also assumes for example that the value 
of health and work ratios are equivalent, which is 
an assumption that could be altered but for the 
moment we will assume they have equal weight. 
Research by Karlsson et al (2009) (see footnote 42) 
derived ‘individualised life tables’ from which it was 
possible to determine values for LE, HLE and WLE 
for different population risk groups at age 50+.  
Using data from the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) the population was split by gender, 
education level, cohabitation, work and health 
status age 50 into 64 sub-groups.  Reasons for 
inclusion of these variables is that each was found 
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to be statistically signiﬁ cant predictors of future LE, 
HLE and WLE. 
This is conﬁ rmed by other research which shows 
that that marriage tends to increase life expectancy, 
and reduce the risk of psychological illness. It 
also shows a strong link between working life 
expectancy, educational level and health (Butt et 
al, 2008)42.  In their research Karlsson et al deﬁ ne 
poor health as the failure of one or more Activities 
of Daily Living (ADLs) such as climbing stairs, or 
washing and feeding oneself. For educational 
attainment they deﬁ ne four levels of attainment: 1 
(‘O’ Level), 2 (‘A’ level), 3 (university degree level), 
and level 4 none of these.
Based on 3 factors, 2 genders and 4 possible 
educational states there are 64 possible sub-groups 
all told that can be ranked from high to low based 
on the index. However, it makes sense to rank males 
and females separately since females spend time 
out of the labour market raising children which 
would distort the ﬁ ndings.  The results shown in 
Annex K, Tables A4 and A5, contain many interesting 
ﬁ ndings.  They show for example that 82.8% of 
males and 53% of females have an index value of 
0.2 or above with value ranges from just above zero 
to 0.4 in the case of the highest ranked males. For 
example:
• The male category with the highest index value 
of 0.39 (row 1) are working, cohabiting, healthy 
males with education level 1. LE, HLE and WLE at 
50 are 38.2, 31.6 and 18 years respectively. They 
comprise about 13% of the male population.
• The male category with the lowest index value 
0.02 (row 32) is exact opposite (not cohabiting, 
unhealthy etc.) with education level 4. LE, HLE 
and WLE are 23.1, 6.5, and 1.8 years. They 
comprise 1.2% of the male population.
Similar results are reported for females.
• The highest female category with an index value 
of 0.3 is working, cohabiting, healthy females 
with education level 1. LE, HLE and WLE at 50 
are 39.9, 29.1, and 14.8 years respectively. They 
comprise 8.4% of the female population.
• The female category with the lowest index value 
0.01 (row 32) are again the exact opposite 
with education level 4 and an LE, HLE and WLE 
respectively of 28.9, 6.8, and 1.3 years. They 
comprise 1.3% of the female population.
The research demonstrates a degree of variability 
on all three measures in the given risk groups. 
Figure 5 is a plot of the percentage of remaining 
life spent in good health against life expectancy at 
50. Each data point is a different sub-group and 
Figure 5
Chart showing percentage of remaining life in good health as a function of life expectancy at age 
50. Contours indicate equivalent states based on remaining years in good health and data points 
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42 Karlsson, M, L. Mayhew, B. Rickayzen (2009) Individualised Life Tables: Investigating Dynamics of Health, Work and Cohabitation in the UK. Jnl 
of Population Ageing 10,1007/S12062-009-9010-8. Butt, Z., S.Haberman, R. Verral (2008) Calculating compensation for loss of future earnings: 
Estimating and using working life expectancy. Jnl of the Royal Statistical Society A, 171, 4, 763-805.
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contours represent equal remaining years spent in 
good health. It shows there is considerably larger 
variability in HLE than there is in LE suggesting 
that HLE is the more malleable but also more 
problematic of the two. It means for example that 
two people with similar life expectancy at age 50 
can spend signiﬁ cantly different proportions of their 
remaining life in good health. Highlighted are three 
data points as examples:  A, a male ranked 1 on HLE 
who is highly educated, working, and cohabiting at 
age 50; B, a female who is ranked 2 not working at 
age 50 but highly educated and cohabiting; and C, a 
male ranked 64 with  both low HLE and LE.
These ﬁ ndings do not necessarily indicate that by 
moving people from a group with a low index value 
into a group with a high index value will mean 
that they will adapt to the lives of those in the new 
group, since it is not a direct causal relationship.  
Being in any group is the consequence of a life 
time of experiences and social ﬁ ltering processes 
that operate before reaching the age of 50 and 
so the opportunities to inﬂ uence which groups 
of people fall into will depending on individual 
circumstances and life time opportunities. The 
results are nevertheless interesting in segmenting 
and quantifying sub-groups at more or less risk and 
are a useful context for framing social policy. 
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5
Implications for UK health and social policy
Previous sections have indicated the impact on 
public services that are in the front line when 
health starts to fail. It showed that based on current 
trends and whilst people are living longer the 
general level of health is likely to worsen due to the 
effects of ageing. It was shown that the economic 
consequences could be represented in a simple 
model that depended solely on the values of life 
expectancy, healthy life expectancy and working life 
expectancy. 
To increase both GDP and standards of living, 
the need to improve healthy life and working life 
expectancies therefore appears inescapable and 
so a balanced long-term approach is needed. 
If improvements in health could be transmitted 
through the age structure then this is likely to 
redress the balance to a degree if one accepts the 
1in 10 scenario proposed by Rickayen and Walsh. 
Results from the model were illustrated using 
scenarios chosen to reﬂ ect different trends in all 
three: living longer, working longer or staying longer 
in good health.  
These scenarios reﬂ ected a time horizon of 2025 
and are compared with a 2007 baseline. It was 
argued that on present trends LE is increasing faster 
than HLE, and that, as we show later, WLE is broadly 
static. The long-term trend does not therefore seem 
favourable in terms of taxes, standard of living and 
economic growth and scenario 1 is an example of 
what could happen in a worst case. At the opposite 
end by closing or at least maintaining the gap 
between HLE and LE, extending working life and 
increasing productivity at historical rates economic 
prospects are much improved (e.g. scenario 4 or 6). 
The probability of any scenario occurring is 
contingent on a range of factors. For example an 
increase in working life expectancy is more difﬁ cult 
to achieve without accompanying improvements 
in health expectancy and labour demand; wage 
productivity is more difﬁ cult to sustain unless 
productivity of older workers in their 50s increases 
to levels of those in their 40s. We now work through 
some arguments that are barriers to improvements 
or opportunities that could make a difference if 
removed. 
Increasing healthy life expectancy – 
barriers and opportunities
It is reasonable to assume that LE will continue 
to increase at historical rates over the immediate 
future and to all intents and purposes it should 
be taken as a ‘given’. The issue of prolonging lives 
of people who are seriously ill or disabled is an 
important component of life extension, as are the 
care consequences of the increasing numbers of 
centenarians expected in the next decades. One 
reason for concern is that male life expectancy 
at age 50 is accelerating and is a key reason for 
supposing that current population projections will 
undershoot the true number of older people in years 
to come. This point is discussed further in a later 
section.
The evidence base for interventions that close 
the gap between LE and HLE is incomplete and 
fragmentary. We have not reached a stage in the 
state of the art where we can say that if we do x this 
will achieve y with an adequate degree of certainty 
and that progress is necessarily incremental and 
long-term. Claims for potential gains in health from 
initiatives often involve double counting of costs 
and sometimes exaggerated beneﬁ ts for publicity 
effect. For example, estimates that heart disease 
costs the healthcare system £3.5bn43 and stroke 
£2.3bn44 are almost certainly inaccurate due to 
double counting due to co-morbidity and other 
effects. 
One reason why LE has improved so much in the 
last 20 years is the success of medical interventions 
particularly in the area of managing heart disease. 
This has apparently had the effect of increasing 
the gap between LE and HLE (i.e. years spent 
with disease). The complementary strategy faced 
43 British Heart Foundation fact sheet 2005
44 Burdens of Disease – a discussion document. Department of Health 1996. 
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with increasing LE is to increase HLE.  Four main 
options arise: (i) improve HLE by spending more 
on healthcare; (ii) remove hazards in society and 
the work place that are known causes of ill health; 
(iii) promote social norms that encourage healthier 
lifestyles such as cohabitation and work; (iv) action 
on education and jobs (since these increase WLE 
as well as HLE).  In the following sections we pick 
a few examples of each but these are by no means 
exhaustive.
Countries that spend more on healthcare generally 
have a higher HLE: however, studies that show gains 
in HLE ﬂ atten off as spend increases are based on 
cross-sectional data and do not take account of 
advances in medical technology. Nevertheless, it 
is interesting that a country like Japan can spend 
less than half the amount per capita as the United 
States and yet achieve an HLE of 75 years at birth as 
compared with 69 in the US. The UK which spends 
a similar amount on healthcare to Japan has an 
HLE of 71 based on data from the World Health 
Organisation (WHO).  Differences in healthcare 
delivery, affordability, organisation and cost control 
are some of the underlying issues explaining the 
differences (e.g. countries with high proportion of 
private healthcare do less well), but also differences 
in lifestyles and degree of inequality. 
Prevention is a general term used and refers 
to disease prevention although there does not 
appear to be a satisfactory way of measuring 
impact on HLE in a general way apart from using 
Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs)45. The onset of 
chronic disease may be regarded as inevitable in 
an ageing population since many other causes of 
death at earlier ages have fallen (e.g. accidents, 
infectious disease). Research shows that signs of 
chronic disease begin at an early age but take time 
to build up into a diagnosis.  Once diagnosed a 
chronic diseases cannot be cured but can often be 
managed through medication and life style changes 
for many years. 
More than 60% of all avoidable deaths are caused 
by cancer and cardiovascular diseases. The top 
10 causes of avoidable deaths are heart disease, 
lung cancer, suicide and self-inﬂ icted injuries, 
colorectal cancer, cerebrovascular diseases, road 
trafﬁ c injuries, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
diseases (COPD), breast cancer, diabetes and 
alcohol-related diseases. Life expectancy from age 
at diagnosis of a chronic disease such as heart 
disease is greater than with cancer although there 
have been signiﬁ cant improvements here too. In 
thinking about the beneﬁ t of health interventions it 
is useful to distinguish between those that promote 
life extensions in a diseased state and those which 
prevent the onset of chronic disease. 
Interventions that prolong life in a disease state 
then need to be subdivided into those that 
allow people to continue work (e.g. those with 
hypertension, diabetes) and those that might not 
(e.g. a stroke). The onset of chronic disease varies 
by individual and may be related to life-style or to 
genetic factors and so the ability to delay disease 
will be an issue relating to both, one of which is 
more amenable to change than the other. If the 
average age of onset of all chronic disease could 
be delayed by one year, then reasonably this might 
translate into a one year improvement in HLE and 
so on. 
Research shows that people diagnosed with 
chronic disease early in life have a reasonable life 
expectancy albeit in a diseased state, whereas 
people diagnosed with the same disease in the 
late stage of life have a shorter life expectancy 
and consume fewer health resources over the 
life course. For example a person diagnosed with 
COPD at age 70 has a 20% chance of dying within 
3.3 years; if diagnosed at age 55 it is 9 years.  The 
general hypothesis is that by delaying the onset of 
chronic conditions results in both a higher HLE and 
LE, but also a shorter gap in years between them. 
It can be argued therefore that policies and actions 
that delay the onset of disease are likely to prove 
less costly in the long run than actions that deal 
with the consequences. Similar lessons were learnt 
in the 19th Century in combating infectious disease 
through the introduction of improved sanitation.  In 
order to measure progress in HLE at a more detailed 
level it would probably pay to set up a bundle of 
indicators to monitor age speciﬁ c new cases of 
chronic diseases such as hypertension, diabetes 
etc. but deﬁ nitions would need to be rigorous for 
comparability purposes. Reduction in the incidence 
of these diseases at younger ages would be one way 
of measuring progress towards improvement in HLE.
Fries (1980) called this process the ‘compression 
of morbidity’ and claimed that ‘whether the period 
of morbidity is shortened depends very much on 
the average age of onset of the ﬁ rst marker (e.g. 
45 Quality Adjusted Life Years, a measure used to evaluate the health beneﬁ ts of different interventions such as new drugs.
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diagnosis of hypertension or ﬁ rst heart attack)’46. 
The earlier the onset, the greater the likelihood of 
a second or third disease such as hypertension 
or diabetes occurring which has the effect further 
increasing healthcare costs through more doctor 
visits, prescriptions etc. (e.g. see Alder et al, 200547). 
People with early stage diagnoses of one chronic 
disease at young ages are more likely to acquire 
further disease before deaths and so the burden of 
disease accumulates in this way and is spread out 
over more years.
Of all the risk factors, smoking remains the most 
important underlying causal factor in cases such 
as lung cancer, heart disease, COPD etc and is 
hence a major cause of avoidable deaths. Despite 
a long-term fall in adult smoking rates to around 
25% today, smoking is estimated to account for 
around 110k deaths a year or around 18% of all 
deaths. Death from smoking related illnesses is 
more expensive than say death from serious stroke 
although there is a paucity of information on life 
time medical costs for different medical conditions. 
US research from a few years ago for example 
showed that life time medical costs of heavy 
smokers and drinkers were four times higher than 
for people with moderate habits48. 
A key question is by how much HLE (and in turn 
WLE) would improve if all smoking were to stop. 
Unpublished research by Karlsson et al49 found that 
non-smokers enjoyed about 6 to 7 more years of 
HLE than smokers, and so a complete cessation of 
smoking would be expected to increase HLE by 1.5 
years over a period of time based on a 25% adult 
smoking rate. Van Baal et al50 found that HLE in 
what they termed a ‘healthy living cohort’ was 54.8 
years for men and 55.4 years for women at age 
20. For male smokers HLE was 7.8 years less and 
for females 6 years less. Crude calculations based 
on the relationship between HLE and healthcare 
spending show that it would require a 50% increase 
in health spending or about £50bn year to achieve 
the same effect (see Annex H). 
46 Fries, J.F. 1980 Aging, natural death, and the compression of morbidity. N Engl J Med. 303(3):130-5.  The Compression of morbidity paradigm 
envisions reduction in cumulative lifetime morbidity through primary prevention by postponing the age of onset of morbidity to a greater amount than 
life expectancy is increased, largely by reducing the lifestyle health risks which cause morbidity and disability.
47 The Chronic Disease Burden – An analysis of health risks and healthcare usage.  (2005) Alder K, L. Mayhew, S Moody. R. Morris and R. Shah. Cass 
Business School, London.
48 Schroeder, S.A., J.A. Showstack, and H.E. Roberts (1979) Frequency and clinical description of high cost patients in 17 acute hospitals. N Engl 
J Med 300:1306-11
49 Cass Business School Press Release: Giving up smoking adds seven years to good health, June 2007.
50 Pieter HM van Baal , Rudolf T Hoogenveen , G Ardine de Wit  and Hendriek C Boshuizen  Estimating health-adjusted life expectancy conditional on risk 
factors: results for smoking and obesity Population Health Metrics 2006, 4:14doi:10.1186/1478-7954-4-14. 
51 E.g. see Seidell J, Verschuren W, van Leer E, Kromhout D (1996) Overweight, underweight, and mortality. A prospective study of 48,287 men and 
women Archives of Internal Medicine; 156: 958 – 963; Bender R, Trautner C, Spraul M, and Berger M (1998) Assessment of Excess Mortality in Obesity 
Am. J. Epidemiology; 147: 42 - 48.
52 A study into the detrimental effects of obesity on life expectancy in the UK (2009) 
Richardson, J., L.Mayhew and B. Rickayzen. www.actuaries.org.uk. 
53 The impact of obesity on employment  by S. Morris, Labour Economics, 2007, 14(3), 413-433.
Obesity, like smoking, is another major risk factor 
that has an adverse impact on health, but unlike 
smoking, obesity is on the increase. Obesity is a 
condition used to describe high levels of body fat 
and is associated with increased risk of morbidity 
and mortality. The Health Survey for England shows 
for example that the proportion of adults classed 
as obese has increased in the UK from 15% in 1993 
to 25% in 2006. The same survey shows that the 
proportion classed as morbidly obese has increased 
from 0.8% in 1993 to 2.1% in 2006. 
Obesity is associated with poor diet, reduced 
physical exercise and social factors as well as an 
increased risk of various life threatening chronic 
diseases. Studies have found for example that 
obese individuals are at increased risk of cancer, 
cardio-vascular diseases and diabetes and had the 
effect of decreasing life expectancy. Similarly the 
relationship between body mass index (BMI) and 
mortality show that risk of death increases when 
BMI is less than 20 kg/ m2 is optimal between 20 
kg/ m2 and 25 kg/ m2 and is increasing for BMI 
categories above this51. 
A 34 year-old obese man was found to live on 
average 4 years less than men with healthy body 
fat levels and a woman 2 years less52.  As obesity 
reduces the age of onset of chronic diseases, it 
means that HLE is reduced also but it is not known 
by how much. Research on the impact of obesity 
does not give ﬁ gures for WLE but shows that that 
obesity exerts a large, statistically signiﬁ cant and 
negative effect on employment for both males and 
females after controlling for health53. It appears that 
the negative effect is greater for the severely obese 
than the obese, and greater for females than males.
The other major health challenge linked to ageing 
is mental health problems which are also to an 
extent co-related with other chronic diseases 
especially in older age. The recent Foresight report 
on mental health and wellbeing in the 21st century 
is an example of another recent Government report 
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54 Foresight Mental Capital and Wellbeing Project (2008).Final Project report – Executive Summary. The Government Ofﬁ ce for Science, London.
55 Living well with dementia: A National Dementia Strategy –Dept of Health
Publication date 3 February 2009.
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/SocialCare/Deliveringadultsocialcare/Olderpeople/NationalDementiaStrategy/index.htm
56 Adult psychiatric morbidity in England, 2007: Results of a household survey. National centre for Social Research; Information Centre for Health and 
Social Care.
57 Deﬁ nition under Disability Discrimination Act
58 English Longitudinal Study of Ageing.
which has expressed health concerns about the 
ageing population54. It notes for example that 
“Dementia will have a substantial and increasing 
impact on individuals and families with the number 
of people affected doubling to 1.4m in the next 
30 years”.  However, it also points out that mental 
health problems are also a factor at all ages, 
affecting speciﬁ c sub-groups such as drug users, 
adolescents, the unemployed, and looked-after 
children. 
In another report55, the cost of dementia is put at 
£17bn a year and that if the onset of dementia 
“could be delayed by 5 years it would reduce deaths 
by 30k a year”. This is an example of how delaying 
the onset of a long-term condition can save lives 
and reduce costs. A problem is that research on how 
mental health problems affect LE, HLE and WLE is 
lacking except in obvious cases such as suicide and 
therefore needs further work before its full impact 
can be assessed (there is no such assessment 
in Foresight). Almost certainly the issues need to 
be broken down into different conditions such as 
dementia but also into different sub-groups to 
understand and measure the long-term effects (e.g. 
by employment status, housing tenure, household 
characteristics, life style). 
The ONS 2007 survey of adult mental health reports 
that the prevalence of mental health conditions 
requiring treatment has increased since 1993 from 
14.1% to 16.4% of the adult population56.  Mental 
health problems overlap in part with harmful 
drinking habits and illicit drug taking. According to 
the same survey 24.2% of adults exceed the limit 
for non hazardous drinking and 3.8% drink harmful 
quantities with rates the highest in the age range 
16-34. Although illicit drug use in the last 12 months 
is reported by 9.2% of adults this increases to 
24.3% in the 16-24 age groups and 19.6% between 
ages 25 and 34. Evidence that mental health is 
an increasing problem is also provided by the 
increased uptake in Incapacity Beneﬁ t by people 
citing mental health conditions (see next section).
Increasing working life expectancy – 
barriers and opportunities
Our simpliﬁ ed model showed that GDP per capita 
and GDP itself could be increased if WLE or HLE are 
increased. The model also showed that an increase 
in HLE is an important adjunct, because healthy 
people are more likely to be in work than unhealthy 
people so that strategies that promote both are 
more likely to be successful. There is research for 
example that shows that people in work enjoy 
better health than people out of work although 
clearly caveats must be applied since causation is 
bi-directional. However, it appears that the effect of 
ill health on the decision to retire is more important 
than the effect of retirement on ill health
Turning to WLE, a key bottleneck within the UK 
labour market is the high economic inactivity 
rate after the age of 48 with increasing levels of 
disability long before state pension age is reached. 
According to the Labour Force Survey, of the 36.3m 
people aged between 20 and 64 years 28.5m are 
economically active. Of the 7.8m economically 
inactive population 3.1m are classiﬁ ed as DDA57 
disabled, leaving 4.7m who are not. Of the 3.8m 
economically inactive aged between 48 and 64, 
1.9m are DDA disabled, leaving 1.9m who are not 
(see tables A1 and A2 in Annex D). 
As Annex D shows, inactivity rates accelerate as 
state pension age is approached and it is probable 
that the two are associated in some way. Some of 
the reasons for high inactivity rates for people aged 
50 to 59 were analysed for this paper using ELSA58 
data (see Annex J). It shows that 26% of males and 
28% of females had failed 1+ ADLs by their 50s and 
that 7.8% of males and 14% of females are carers. It 
ﬁ nds that a male is 1.28 times more likely to work if 
he is educated and 2.87 times more likely if he is a 
home owner. In the case of females the equivalent 
odds are 1.72 times and 2.01 times. 
Being long-term sick or disabled has a greater 
effect than individual caring responsibilities on 
work status. For example the analysis shows that a 
man is 7.14 times less likely to work if he has failed 
1+ ADLs and a woman 4.35 times. By contrast a 
man is 1.46 times less likely to work if he is a carer 
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and a woman 1.23 times less likely. Such direct 
evidence suggests a ﬁ ltering process in which 
healthy educated home owners are more likely to 
be economically active in their 50s even if they have 
caring responsibilities and poor health. 
Earlier estimates in this paper suggested an 
increase in demand for carers from 3.3 million 
whole time equivalents to 4.6 m in 2025 based 
on scenario A, but a fall to 3.6m based on health 
improvement scenario O. The probability of having 
elderly frail relatives tends to be higher in a person’s 
50s and so increased caring responsibilities could 
become a bigger barrier to work over time but 
health improvements could mitigate this59. Other 
evidence elicited from this analysis found for 
example that males were 1.4 times less likely to 
work if they were smokers and 2.12 times more 
likely if they were cohabiting. It was noteworthy that 
the same two variables had a neutral impact on 
females.
Health deterioration accelerates in this age range 
and there is a very close correlation on three 
independent measures: the LFS economically 
inactive disabled rate, the percentage of people on 
long-term sick and disability beneﬁ ts, and anyone 
scoring 1+ on the Rickayzen-Walsh disability model 
(see Annex D, Figure A7). In terms of income it is 
noteworthy that average weekly earnings peak 
when a person is in their 40s; also the number of 
beneﬁ ciaries of tax credits which boost income for 
people in work falls notably after age 50 presumably 
as a result of dependent children leaving home60.  
Annex M considers the beneﬁ t replacement rates 
for people on the minimum income and average 
earnings and shows that for a person or couple 
claiming income support disability premium 
replacement rates are very high i.e. either income 
may need to be higher or beneﬁ ts lower. Thus 
we have four factors that are affecting economic 
participation from an individual perspective: lower 
wage incentives, more caring responsibilities, 
increasing rates of disability, and impending state 
pension age.  
Strong conﬁ rmation that mental health problems 
are replacing other conditions as a reason for 
economic inactivity is available from Incapacity 
Beneﬁ t data. The claimant load as a percentage 
of the working age population has increased from 
around 3% in the 1960s to over 7% today. However, 
a recent phenomenon is claimants citing mental and 
behavioural disorders which have increased both as 
a proportion of all new claimants and of the overall 
caseload.  Those with mental and behavioural 
disorders as a primary indicator accounted for 
over 40% of the total caseload in 2006 compared 
to 26% in 1996. This trend represents a growing 
challenge as this group typically have poorer work 
records and prospects61. 
Beneﬁ t data also show that the probability of 
leaving beneﬁ ts is lower for those who have been 
in receipt for more than 12 months which tends 
to apply to older workers than those with shorter 
durations. Factors on the demand side of the labour 
equation include the difﬁ culties of ﬁ nding jobs for 
people 50+ that have been made redundant as a 
result of previous economic downturns, company 
closures etc., and skill gaps between jobseekers 
and prospective employers. The causes of economic 
inactivity are therefore many but the net effect of 
both push and pull factors has been to constrain 
and dampen economic activity rates in this critical 
age range and so prevent a crucial extension to 
effective WLE. 
To see how slow change can be in this area we 
need to look at labour participation trends. Average 
labour participation rates over the age range 
reached a peak in 1990 at around 63% before 
falling and remaining broadly static at 62% until 
2002. Since then they have started to rise again 
and were at 64% in 2008. This masks signiﬁ cant 
differences between males and females with the 
rate of economic activity among males falling from 
75% at its peak in 1990 and levelling out at 71% 
today. The rate for females increased rapidly up to 
1990 from 47% in 1984 to 52 %. Since then it has 
increased more slowly to around 57% in 2008.  
Since 1999 ‘Opportunity for All’62 has presented 
an annual overview of Government action to 
tackle poverty and social exclusion. Although our 
focus here is on health it does report encouraging 
changes in participation rates for speciﬁ c sub-
groups with lower than average participation 
rates. For example rates for ethnic minorities have 
increase by 2.8% since 2000 to 60.1% and lone 
parents by 6.0% to 57.2%. The comparable ﬁ gures 
for disabled people are an increase of 5.8% to 
59 See also Carers, Employment and Services Report Series (2007), A series of reports produced by Carers UK and University of Leeds.
60 HMRC Child and Working Tax Credits Statistics December 2008 Table 3.1
61 Based on work undertaken for the ‘Black Report’: ‘Working for a healthier tomorrow’(2008) HMG.
62 Opportunity for All: Indicators Update, DWP October 2007.
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63 Birmingham: Adult mortality and life expectancy (2008). MHA Ltd. www.nkm.org.uk
64 Health Inequalities Target Monitoring – Life expectancy at birth, source: Department of Health
65 Eddy van Doorslaer and Xander Koolman: Explaining the differences in income-related health inequalities across European countries (email: 
vandoorslaer@bmg.eur.nl). Department of Health Policy & Management, Erasmus University, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
47.2%. This research shows that labour market 
policies can make a difference albeit at a slow rate 
of progress, although cynics might argue that it 
would have happened anyway due to favourable 
economic conditions.
To put these ﬁ ndings into a more strategic context, 
assuming a steady state with constant numbers of 
people entering the job market in their 20s, each 1% 
rise in participation rate would equate to around a 
6 month increase in effective WLE. For males at age 
20 current effective WLE is estimated to be 39 years 
and so an increase in participation rate of 2% over 
a period of time would be equivalent to an increase 
of 1 year.  With theoretical working life expectancy 
of around 40 years based on state pension age for 
women and customary occupational retirement 
age for men, there is arguably room for increases 
in participation rates without having to increase 
pension age although the gap is narrow. However, 
built-in inertia through forced spells of inactivity and 
adverse employment prospects for older workers 
makes this theoretical limit very difﬁ cult to achieve. 
LFS data on working beyond state pension age 
shows better news. Here participation rates 
increased from 8% to 11% for males and 7% to 12% 
for females between 1984 and 2008. From previous 
discussion, research shows that people with the 
longest effective WLE are educated, specialists, 
professionals, such as academics whose earnings 
tend to peak later in life and who are in better 
health. This suggests that investment in education 
and training pays off in terms of extending WLE in 
later career and is advantageous in ﬁ nding a job 
after spells of absence form the labour force (e.g. to 
bring up children or look after elderly relatives).
Strategies aimed at reducing inequalities
As well as tackling individual areas of public health 
concern such as smoking, obesity and excessive 
drinking, there is substantial research linking 
ill health to social inequalities and deprivation. 
Inequalities are deﬁ ned on several different levels 
for an individual, neighbourhood or society and 
measures of inequality include income, wealth, 
housing, education, access to services etc. These 
are usually known as ‘underlying causes of ill 
health’ rather than say smoking which is a ‘direct 
cause’ and often found in more deprived areas. 
Outcome measures for geographical areas are 
usually expressed in units of excess mortality (e.g. 
standardised mortality ratios), or health (healthy life 
expectancy) and there is a wealth of data that show 
huge variation across the country although there is 
as yet no targets for HLE (e.g. see Health Statistics 
Quarterly Vol. 40, 2008). 
Lifting the worst performing areas to the levels of 
better performing areas and thus to the level of the 
best, is usually how inequality targets are framed. 
The Government target for England is to reduce 
the gap in LE at birth between the ﬁ fth of local 
authorities with the worst health and deprivation 
indicators (known as ‘the Spearhead Group’) and 
the population as a whole (England), by at least 
10% by 2010. This is a tall order as at the local level 
the differences in life expectancy can be substantial. 
Research carried out in Birmingham in 2008 found 
male life expectancy at birth in Birmingham is 
76.3 years (1.25 years less for England), but that 
the population sub-group with the lowest life 
expectancy were for males in social housing and 
council tax band A (the lowest value band for tax 
purposes) . For this group the life expectancy at 
birth is 69.5 years, nearly 7 years less than the mean 
male life expectancy at birth.
In 2004-2006, the relative gap in life expectancy at 
birth between England and the Spearhead Group 
was wider than at the baseline for the target (1995-
1997) for both males and females. For males the 
relative gap was 2% wider than at the baseline (the 
same as in 2003-2005), for females 11% wider 
(compared to 8% wider in 2003-2005) . To achieve 
the target the gap needs to be 2.32% in 2009-2011 
but an examination of trends in life expectancy 
at national level from 1950 onwards conﬁ rms the 
difﬁ culty reducing variation at the national level.  
The causal mechanisms connecting inequalities to 
poor health are more indirect and diffuse than they 
are for chronic diseases but statistical associations 
between inequalities and poor health outcomes are 
convincing.  Comparative European studies show 
that the UK has higher income related inequality 
than all other countries apart from Portugal. The 
contribution of different reasons for this have been 
analysed by van Doorslaer and Koolman using an 
interesting and novel modelling approach .
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The Government has introduced a wider range of 
measures to tackle the problem and is not simply 
targeting life expectancy which should be regarded 
more as one outcome measure based on a whole 
raft of social policies. Brieﬂ y, they include equal 
opportunities legislation designed to combat 
gender, age, race and religious discrimination and 
action in areas such as child poverty, education 
etc., which if successfully addressed can also 
be expected to improve health over time by 
transporting people into groups that, as previous 
discussion demonstrated, leads to a fuller and 
healthier life. 
We have already noted that international evidence 
suggested that HLE is improved by improving GDP 
and reducing inequalities. In a recession as living 
standards stagnate or fall, reducing inequalities 
becomes more important as a health stabiliser 
and employment for maintaining income. So the 
issue becomes one of whether these policies taken 
together will achieve improved health and at the 
same time be recession proof. There is no reason 
to suppose that they will not, but how fast and 
whether the actions taken will be enough is another 
question. 
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6
Limits to life
Policy makers are pulled in two directions. At one 
extreme they wrestle with the problem of how 
society will be able to cope with the burgeoning 
numbers of elderly in terms of healthcare costs and 
pensions, and at the other, of promoting a healthy 
living and risk-avoiding culture so that people are 
able to live longer active and more productive 
lives. We have reached the present position in 
which the majority of UK citizens live until they are 
at least 80 years old as a result of many factors 
and inﬂ uences spread over 150 years.  In coming 
decades the number of centenarians will increase 
into the thousands which obviously has signiﬁ cant 
implications for caring services.
Two questions that arise from this analysis therefore 
is whether there is a maximum life span and what 
happens if our current projections are wrong? On 
the ﬁ rst question there is a split of opinion. One 
camp says that there must be biological limits to life 
expectancy and it is only a matter of ‘when’ and not 
‘if’ the limit is reached (e.g. see Olshansky, 200166). 
The other camp points to the fact that there has 
been an unbroken linear rise in life expectancy of 
about three months a year for at least 150 years and 
that there are no signs of this abating (Oeppen and 
Vaupel, 2006).  They show that in the leader board 
of life expectancies, the position has changed many 
times over the years with, for example, New Zealand 
in the ﬁ rst half of last century leading the way, then 
Scandinavia, brieﬂ y Switzerland, and now Japan67.
On the second question, looking at present trends, 
it seems fairly certain that the rapid improvements 
in life expectancy are set to continue for the time 
horizon under consideration in this paper and will 
affect some of the conclusions (e.g. see Annex I). 
So rapid have the improvements been that ofﬁ cial 
population forecasts have become increasingly 
inaccurate especially at older ages. Accompanying 
increases in working life expectancy and healthy life 
expectancy have not been as fast. Cass researchers 
found for example, that GAD 1981 male population 
projections of the 50+ age group become 
increasingly inaccurate within 10 years, and out by 
almost 30% after 20 years. 
Most of the recent errors are concentrated in the 
oldest ages.  GAD itself has reviewed the errors 
(see Population Trends 28, 2007), noting that: 
‘the implications of projection accuracy will differ 
for different users’ and the largest errors are ‘for 
the very young and very old’. However, GAD is in 
good company since many demographic agencies 
throughout the world have experienced similar 
problems in that they have failed to capture the 
rapid expansion in longevity at older ages.
Major decisions on policy depend on the accuracy 
of future ﬁ nancial estimates which in turn depend 
on population forecasts that are assumed to be 
fairly accurate. A simple example would be changes 
to state pension age which were last altered in 
the 1990s in order for males and female age to be 
equalised at 65 from 202068. The analysis in this 
paper shows that the then forecasts would not have 
anticipated the pressures to make further increases 
between 2020 and 2030.  
Tests using a novel population projection 
methodology under development at Cass Business 
School, obtained more accurate results than GAD 
using data from 1981 and 1991 to project the 
actual (i.e. known) population in 200169.  It then 
used the model to compare results with published 
GAD forecasts for 2020 to see what difference it 
would make on the assumption that projection 
performance would be better.  Since there are 
different trends in life expectancies between males 
66 Prospects for Human Longevity (2001) S. Jay Olshansky,* Bruce A. Carnes, Aline Désesquelles, Science, Vol 291, Issue 5508, 1491-1492 [DOI: 
10.1126/science.291.5508.1491]
67 Oeppen, J. and J.W.Vaupel (2002) Broken Limits to Life Expectancy, Science, 29 6 (5570), 1029-1031. The oldest veriﬁ ed person to have ever lived was 
French woman Jeanne Louise Calment with a conﬁ rmed lifespan of 122 years 164 days. 
68 As a result of the decision in Barber, Pensions Act 1995 s.62 was passed to provide that an occupational pension scheme which does not contain 
an equal treatment rule is treated as including one. This provision is treated as having had effect in relation to any pensionable service on or after 
17th May 1990. As a consequence, phasing in of equal ages for start of State Pensions takes place between 2010 and 2020 (Pensions Act, 1995)
69 Whither human survival and longevity: The shape of things to come. Mayhew L. and D. Smith forthcoming  actuarial research paper. Cass 
Business School
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and females, it was necessary to model them 
separately. 
Using the same assumptions as GAD about birth 
rates and migration but different assumptions for 
mortality at age 50+, the Cass model showed an 
excess of 0.48m males and 0.11m females or 0.59m 
altogether over GAD, so the results are closer on 
females but much wider apart on males for whom 
life expectancy has been increasing faster. These 
differences are shown in Tables 8 and 9 separately 
for males and females, but do not include the 
Table 8
Comparison of male population projected from 2001, model versus GAD
age  GAD 2020 Model Diff Diff %
50-59 3,788,205  3,809,512  21,306  0.56%
60-69 3,014,841  3,111,925  97,084  3.22%
70-79 2,324,314  2,504,966  180,653  7.77%
80-89 978,574  1,164,099  185,525  18.96%
total 10,105,934  10,590,502  484,568  4.79%
Table 9
Comparison of female population projected from 2001, model versus GAD
age  GAD 2020 Model Diff Diff %
50-59 3,962,913  3,963,685  771  0.02%
60-69 3,203,880  3,202,956  -924  -0.03%
70-79 2,632,919  2,645,805   12,886  0.49%
80-89 1,344,369  1,442,493  98,124  7.30%
Total 11,144,081  11,254,939  110,858  0.99%
oldest old (>90 years) where there is more 
uncertainty.
To put this into perspective the value an extra 
0.59m people indicated by the Cass model would 
add each year about £2.9bn to the cost of the state 
pension alone. The apparent accuracy of the Cass 
model over the GAD projections in the period from 
1980 does not guarantee its greater accuracy in the 
period to 2020; however, in framing and costing 
future policy it suggests it would be wise to check 
current estimates.
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7
Conclusions
Life expectancy is increasing rapidly and will continue 
to do so in the time horizon of this analysis. The UK 
population will age rapidly from now on as the old 
age support ratio goes into long-term decline (ratio 
of adults of working age to the population aged 
65+).  This paper ﬁ nds that the implications of these 
demographic changes are signiﬁ cant and should not 
be underestimated. 
In 2007 there were 3.8 people aged 20-54 for every 
person aged 65+; based on ofﬁ cial population 
projections this will fall to 2.8 by 2025 but it could be 
2.7 if life expectancy continues to increase at present 
rates. In order to restore that balance to the value in 
2008 would require 14m extra people of working age 
or a net population addition of 0.8m people per year 
from 2008. However, based on maintaining the ratio 
between healthy and unhealthy people suggests a 
lower but still very high ﬁ gure of 8m extra people. 
Migration, an indicator of labour shortages, has 
increased in recent years due in part to EU expansion 
and favourable economic conditions as Figure 6 
shows. Whereas in the 1960s there was net outﬂ ows 
of population the trend has switched to net inﬂ ows 
currently running at 0.25m a year. Migration is 
sensitive to economic factors and net inﬂ ows may fall 
during the present recession but the underlying labour 
shortages will exert signiﬁ cant migration pressures for 
the foreseeable future as the population ages.
Most people would agree that population additions 
on the implied scale would be disproportionate and 
an unacceptable strain on UK resources and social 
structures; moreover it would lead to its own long-term 
problems as migrants themselves aged.
To support the additional numbers of older people 
indicated from present projections will require a 
number of things to occur. 
Firstly there needs to be improvements in healthy life 
expectancy that match or preferably exceed increases 
in life expectancy. Increases in healthy life expectancy 
relative to life expectancy will reduce the need for 
healthcare, older people’s services, and social security 
beneﬁ ts and hence the tax burden. It will increase the 
pool of people available for work and enable people, 
if they wish to work beyond retirement age albeit in a 
more limited capacity.
As Fries has pointed out chronic disease has become 
the norm in older populations and measures that 
can limit the age of onset of chronic disease will 
concentrate morbidity into fewer years and limit the 
increasing phenomenon of co-morbidity (multiple 
chronic diseases) which results in more impairment, 
medical care, demands for older people services etc.
Spending ever more on healthcare may be self-
defeating. Investing more in preventing disease may 
be a better investment but improved metrics are 
Figure 6
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needed to measure the long-term effectiveness of 
prevention policies. Clearly, removing from society 
harmful risk factors will have wider beneﬁ ts. Smoking 
is a classic example. More gains in healthy life years 
would be obtained from a complete cessation of 
smoking than would be achieved by increasing 
healthcare spending by 50%. However, there is 
a strategic weakness in this area as prevention 
programmes are not as well evaluated as for example 
are the economic beneﬁ ts of new drug treatments. 
With the exception of a few areas, we do not know how 
many extra healthy life years are gained for each £1 of 
expenditure on prevention.
Secondly, there needs to be an increase in working 
life expectancy comparable to increases in healthy life 
expectancy. Presently far too many people become 
economically inactive before normal retirement 
age. It  is observed for example that people with the 
longest working life expectancy tend to be educated, 
cohabiting, and home-owning and being healthy at 
age 50. Conversely people aged 50+ are less like to 
be in work if they have caring responsibilities (usually 
elderly relatives but also partners) or are unhealthy, a 
situation that applies to approximately 30% of males 
in this age range and 37% of females (depending on 
the measure and data source used). 
In these circumstances changes in pension age are 
arguably unlikely to succeed if people vote with their 
feet and leave or are pushed to leave work before 
pension age.  For many people incomes before state 
pension age pension is topped up by working age 
social security beneﬁ ts (Incapacity Beneﬁ t, Carers 
Allowance, Disability Living Allowance, Income 
Support, Council Tax Beneﬁ t and Housing Beneﬁ t). 
As pension age is increased this will continue and 
expenditure will be higher unless labour participation 
rates are increased.  One unwelcome effect of this will 
be to offset anticipated public expenditure gains from 
increasing female state pension age to 2020 and then 
beyond.
It is calculated that participation rates would need to 
increase by at least 2% in order to increase working 
life expectancy by 1 year, but we calculate that the 
increases will need to be higher than this. Low 
participation rates in the 50+ age range are one of the 
bottlenecks identiﬁ ed that prevents this happening. 
We have not analysed labour demand issues in this 
paper in detail but the fact that average wages tend 
to peak in a person’s mid-40s may lead to negative 
associations with employment and further reduce 
incentives to work. Beneﬁ t replacement rates start to 
look attractive after 50 especially for people in low 
paid jobs and may provide another inducement not to 
undertake paid work.
Labour participation rates have been slowly recovering 
since peaking in 1989 and are now back to the levels 
then. The difference is that males rates have fallen 
and female rates have risen. Given that the damage 
caused to participation rates in the past are linked 
to earlier recessions, it would be deeply ironic if the 
hard fought gains in rates in recent years were to be 
undermined by the current recession and thus lead to 
another extended period of either stagnant or falling 
participation rates.  
In conclusion, the demography of the UK is changing 
rapidly and the signs are that population in the mid-
2020s will exceed ofﬁ cial forecasts.  The current UK 
population of around 60.6m is projected to increase 
to 68.9m by 2025, and will be higher still if migration 
rates continue and current trends in life expectancy 
are maintained. To put this into a wider context, every 
extra million people accounted for corresponds to a 
city the size of Birmingham! 
There are hence four key economic messages from this 
analysis:
1. If the UK is to succeed economically in the 
coming decades, increases in life expectancy 
need to be balanced by improvements in working 
life expectancy and healthy life expectancy, 
although there is some ﬂ exibility since to a 
degree they are interchangeable. 
2. Failure to do so could lead to increased migration 
pressures increasing the UK population still 
further. To some extent higher productivity may 
offset these pressures but since older workers are 
less productive than younger workers this cannot 
be guaranteed.
3. While a growing population will lead to greater 
GDP it may not translate into improved GDP 
per capita, and under some scenarios living 
standards could fall and taxes rise steeply.
4. An ‘active-ageing’ scenario on the other hand 
would result in a more manageable population, 
and both increased living standards and 
GDP growth.   This would involve balanced 
improvements in health and working life 
expectancy and supply side conditions to enable 
people to work longer and live healthier lives.
Overall the tone of this paper has been pessimistic in 
outlook. To some extent the arguments presented ﬂ y 
in the face of the generally received wisdom that living 
longer is a mark of a successful society and therefore 
a ‘good’ thing. Old age is rightly celebrated but it will 
not be celebrated in coming decades unless there 
are accompanying changes in healthy life expectancy 
and working life expectancy. The problem is that 
one year of extra life is being valued by society the 
same, whether it is a ‘healthy’ or ‘unhealthy’ life year. 
However, the analysis has also shown that relatively 
small changes in healthy life expectancy and working 
life expectancy can make a big difference. 
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A difﬁ culty is that that HLE and WLE move very slowly 
over time and is the result of a combination of factors 
in some cases acting over decades. This suggests 
that governments should ‘proof’ social policies to 
ensure that ones that extend life expectancy are 
balanced by policies that extend health and working 
life expectancy. The evidence of this paper is current 
policies appear to be more successful at increasing 
life expectancy than they do at increasing working life 
expectancy or healthy life expectancy. In demographic 
terms, the UK is at a turning point but the real crunch is 
still a few years hence. This suggests there is a window 
of opportunity in which to change direction to one 
based on the ‘active ageing’ scenario above.
In conclusion, this paper has shown that the 
accumulation of healthy life years is preferable to the 
accumulation of unhealthy life years, but this needs to 
change faster if the challenges of an ageing population 
are to be met.  A further problem is that health is 
measured in different ways but the metrics used in this 
paper suggest that there are gradations of health and 
that different metrics are needed for different purposes 
(not all unhealthy life years are equivalent). Finally 
there are signs that the received wisdom that we are 
living longer but also living healthier and longer are 
also changing. As the OECD recently noted:
‘One of the main policy implications that can been 
drawn from the ﬁ ndings of this study is that it would 
not be prudent for policy-makers to count on future 
reductions in the prevalence of severe disability 
among elderly people to offset completely the 
rising demand for long-term care that will result 
from population ageing’ (Long-Term Care for Older 
People, OECD, 2005)
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Annex A
Changes in the UK and Japanese old age, 
young age and total support ratios
This annex compares changes in demographic 
support ratios in the UK and Japan. In Japan the 
deﬁ nition differs slightly with young persons deﬁ ned 
from 0-14 instead of 0-19. The old age support 
ratio is deﬁ ned as the number of people aged 65+ 
divided by the number aged between 15 and 64; 
the young person support ratio is deﬁ ned as the 
number of persons aged 15-64 to the number aged 
0-14; and the total support ratio to the number 
aged 15-64 divided by the number aged 0-14 plus 
the number aged 65+.
Typically countries will go through three 
demographic stages characterized sequentially: (i) 
a phase with a low child support ratio, and high old-
age dependency ratio; (2) a point when the old age 
and young age support ratios cross each other; and 
(3) a phase with a high child support ratio and a low 
old age support ratio.
We ﬁ nd that the pattern of change in support ratios 
is similar in both countries although Japan had 
relatively much fewer older people than the UK at 
the start of the periods under consideration. Both 
countries initially experienced spurts in fertility with 
large rises in the numbers of young people, Japan 
more so than the UK. Figure A1 shows changes in 
the three support ratios from 1980 and expected 
changes to 2030 for the UK. 
It shows that the old age support ratio is fairly 
constant up to 2007 when it stood at 3.8 (4.2 based 
on 15-64) after which it enters into a steep decline 
and is due to reach 2.5 (2.8 based on 15-64) in 
2030. The young persons support ratio increases 
over the period peaking in 2012, whereas the total 
support ratio peaks in 2007 (2007, based on 15-64). 
As shown in Figure A2 the old age support ratio in 
Japan was over 12 at the start of the period in 1950 
falling to 3.1 in 2007, and is due to fall further to 
2.0 by 2030. The old age and young age support 
ratios meanwhile cross each other in 1998. It is 
noteworthy that in Japan the total support ratio 
peaked in 1992 at 2.4 and in the UK in 2007 at 
2.0 in equivalent units, 15 years later.  From a 
comparative viewpoint it means the UK has had 15 
more years to reach the same turning point. 
i) United Kingdom
Figure A1
Changes in (a) the UK old age support ratio (20-64)/65+; (b) young age support ratio (20-64)/ (0-19); 
and (c) the total support ratio (20-64)/ ((0-19) +65+) between 1980 and 2030
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ii) Japan
Figure A2
Changes in (a) the Japanese old age support ratio (15-64)/65+; (b) young age support ratio
 (15-64)/65+; and (c) the total support ratio (15-64)/ ((0-14) +65+) between 1950 and 2030. 
Note: Japanese young person’s support ratio based on 0-14 year olds
In economic terms the larger number of working 
age people relative to the young and old population 
tends to result in higher levels of economic activity 
since more people are economically active. This is 
sometimes called the demographic dividend and is 
generally associated with higher economic output, 
saving and hence investment70. In practice, it is 
difﬁ cult to separate out long-term dividend effects 
from short term economic effects in economic data. 
Figure A3
Chart showing the percentage change in GDP and annual change in the total support ratio 
(Japan 1953 to 2007)
To date we only have the Japanese experience to go 
by over a sufﬁ ciently long period.
However, Figure A3 provides some evidence for a 
‘dividend’ effect. It plots year on year percentage 
change in GDP from 1953 to 2007 and annual 
changes in the total support ratio. Brieﬂ y, following 
the war the Japanese economy boomed reaching 
real growth rates of 12% per annum in the mid 
1960s and therefore comparable with China today. 
70 e.g. see Demographic Transition and Economic Growth in China (2006). Cai Fang and Wang Dewen Institute of Population and Labour Economics 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, wangdw@cass.org.cn http://iple.cass.cn/ﬁ le/Demographic_Transition_and_Economic_Growth_in_China.pdf
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By the 1990s growth rates fell to 2% before 
stagnating and going into recession in 1994 and 
1998. The chart shows that net additions to GDP 
tended to increase with the value of the total 
support ratio although the recessionary effects and 
stagnation of the 1990s have their origins in the 
asset bubble of the early 1990s.  In all probability 
the changing Japanese demography and economic 
stagnation are connected as various research 
seeks to demonstrate (e.g. see McKellar et al, 2004 
~footnote 5)
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Annex B
Effect of changes in state retirement age on 
old age support ratio
Figure A4
Shows the ages to which state pension age (SPA) would need to be raised in order to maintain the 


























































A B C D
State pension age (spa) is currently 65 for males 
and 60 for females and notionally 62.5 for males 
and females. Figure A4 shows that in 2007 at age 
62.5 there were 3.3 persons aged 20-64 for every 
person over this age (point A). Between 2010 and 
2020 female pension age will increase by 6 months 
each year until it reaches 65, the same as males 
in 2020. 
Figure A4 shows that to maintain the dependency 
ratio where it was in 2007 joint pension age in 2020 
would need to rise to 65.5 years (B), 66.5 years by 
2025 (C), and to 67.5 years by 2030(D). By contrast 
the Pension Commission proposed increases in 
state pension age to 66 by 2030, 67 by 2040 and 
68 by 2050, although their calculations were based 
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Annex C shows how pension age would need to 
change in order to maintain the same dependency 
ratios as for 2007 in 2025. A health adjusted 
support ratio is based on the number of healthy 
people below healthy life expectancy (HLE) to the 
number of people aged above HLE, where HLE is 
deﬁ ned as the number of expected years in good 
health at age 20.  Figure A5 plots this ratio against 
HLE based on the UK population in 2007 and the 
projected population in 2025. It shows the current 
value of HLE in 2007 (point A, 50 years) for which a 
support ratio of 6 is indicated (point B). If there are 
no improvements in health, this ratio will slip to 4.5 
(point C). To restore the ratio to its value in 2007 the 
chart shows that there would need to be a 3.5 year 
increase in HLE (point D).
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Annex C
Health support ratio 
Figure A5
Relationship between the ratio of people below healthy life expectancy at age 20 to the number of 
people aged above healthy life expectancy at age 20 in 2007 and 2025 
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Annex D
Labour market participation 
Table A1 provides a breakdown of UK economic 
activity based on people aged 20 to 64 in the UK 
between July 2007 and June 2008. Of the 36.3m 
total, 7.8 m are economically inactive, and of these 
3.1m are classiﬁ ed as ‘LFS (Labour Force Survey) 
disabled’.
Table A1
Breakdown of UK labour market activity by population category between ages of 20 and 
64 (millions)
Employment category  Males (millions) Females (millions) Total (millions)
economically active 15.4 13.1 28.5
economically inactive of which 2.6 5.2 7.8
 DDA disabled 1.4 1.7 3.1
 not DDA disabled 1.2 3.5 4.7
Total  18.0 18.3 36.3
Figure A6
Chart showing trend in percentage of population economically active by male and female
As Figure A6 shows, the rate of economic activity 
among males fell from 76% at its peak in 1990 
and has leveled out at around 71% since. The rate 
for females increased rapidly to 1990 from 47% in 
1984 to 52 % since when it has increased at around 
0.3% per annum to 57% in 2008. The aggregate 
of males and female participation rates remained 
broadly static at 62% until 2002 since when it has 
increased to 64% by 2008.
47
Increasing longevity and the economic value of healthy ageing and working longer
Figure A7 breaks down participation rates by single 
year of age. The pattern of economic activity by age 
shows that male activity rates are higher at every 
age from 20 onwards. From age 40, male activity 
rates start to decline whereas female rates increase 
until age 50. After 50 there is an accelerated decline 
in both male and female rates especially after age 
60. Beyond 65 years the decline slows down but 
data are more unreliable after age 70.  However, to 
put this into perspective international comparison 
show that Japan has the highest labour participation 
rate after age 65 at 20%; the UK is around 7%, and 
France 1%.
Figure A7
Chart showing trend in % of population economically active by age for males and females (A male 





















































The complementary chart in Figure A8 shows the 
joint male-female pattern for economic inactivity 
and clearly indicates the acceleration in inactivity 
rates post 50. Also included are rates based on 
the LFS calculated from the number classiﬁ ed as 
DDA disabled. The gap between the economic 
inactivity rate and the DDA disabled inactivity 
rate is a minimum at age 48 when it falls to 5%, 
suggesting that the majority of people who can work 
are economically active at this age. After 48 the gap 
widens as age 65 approaches as greater numbers 
of healthy as well as unhealthy people withdraw 
from economic activity. Of the 12.6m people in this 
age group 3.8m are economically inactive, of which 
1.9m are DDA disabled and 1.9m are not (see Table 
A2).
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Figure A9 shows in more detail the correspondence 
between the LFS inactive disability rate, claimant 
rate for long-term sick and disability beneﬁ ts  
and the rate based on 1+ on the disability scale 
produced by the model. The chart shows that 
all three series, LFS, beneﬁ t rates and 1+ on the 
Table A2
Population aged 48-64 by activity status and gender (millions)
Employment category   Males (ms) Females (ms) Total (ms)
economically active  4.8 4.0 8.8
economically inactive of which 1.4 2.4 3.8
          DDA disabled 0.9 1.0 1.9
     not DDA disabled 0.5 1.4 1.9
total  6.2 6.4 12.6
Figure A8
Chart showing trend in % of population economically active by male and female; LFS rate for DDA 
disabled by age; beneﬁ t rate for people on long-term sick and disability beneﬁ ts (A male state 
pension age; B female state pension age)
disability scale, give an almost identical picture.  
Thus three independent sources of data, the LFS 
DDA economically inactive, the percentage on long-
term sick and disability beneﬁ ts, and the Rickayzen-
Walsh disability number produce similar ﬁ ndings.
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Figure A9 
Percentage of the population disabled and economically inactive according to the LFS, beneﬁ t 
claimants and the Rickayzen-Walsh model from age 20 to 70
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Annex E
Trends in life expectancy and 
healthy life expectancy 
Figure A10
Chart showing trends in life expectancy and healthy life expectancy since 1980 and 
trend projections
 
Figure A10 is a graph of three in joint male and 
female life expectancy (LE) and healthy life 
expectancy (HLE)  at birth (source ONS). Analysis 
shows that life expectancy has increased at 77 days 
per year since 1980 and HLE at 49 days per year 
increasing the gap by 28 days per year. In 2007, for 
example, the gap between LE and HLE at birth was 
10.1 years. Based on the trends given, the gap will 
increase to 11.5 years by 2025. Interestingly, the 
gap between LE and HLE exhibits an upward trend 
not only in absolute terms: the proportion of life 
spent in ill healthwill increase from 12.7% in 2007 
to 13.8% in 2025.
Notes to graph
1. Source for Life Expectancy: Government Actuary’s 
Department.  
2. Source for Healthy Life Expectancy: Ofﬁ ce for National 
Statistics.  
3. General Household Survey (GHS) question is used to 
calculate good and fairly good general health rates: Q. 
Over the last 12 months would you say your health has 
on the whole been good, fairly good, or not good?  
(The GHS was not conducted in either 1997 or 1999. The 
resulting modiﬁ cations to the annual series of HLE data 
are: a) no data points are calculated for the years 1996, 
1998 and 2000; b) the data points for 1997 and 1999 
are each calculated on just two years of GHS health data, 
1997 on 1996 and 1998 data and 1999 on 1998 and 
2000 data). 
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Annex F
Statistical relationship between long-term 
sickness and disability beneﬁ ts and 
disability scale for age ranges 20-64 and 65+
Figure A11
Chart showing trends in life expectancy and healthy life expectancy since 1980 and 
trend projections
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The total annual cost of long-term sick and disability 
beneﬁ ts in the UK is around £15.5bn with another 
£1.2bn for Carers Allowance. If to these totals, 
means tested beneﬁ ts are added comprising 
Income Support, Housing and Council Tax beneﬁ ts 
the total increases to £28.4bn a year (about 2% of 
GDP)72. 
Figure A11 shows the relationship between the 
numbers at each age claiming either Incapacity 
Beneﬁ t, Disability Living Allowance or both from 
age 20 to 64 against the number of people scoring 
1+ on the Rickayzen-Walsh disability model using 
Scenario A. 
It shows that the numbers of disabled predicted 
by the model and the number of beneﬁ ciaries are 
closely correlated.  The number of beneﬁ ciaries 
exceeds the number predicted on the disability 
scale at each age by a constant amount and could 
be the result of several factors relating either to the 
beneﬁ ts, or to the measurement scale (delays in 
ﬂ ows off beneﬁ t, over claiming).   
Figure A12 shows: i) the number of DLA beneﬁ ts 
in payment by age; ii) the number of Attendance 
Allowance payments and iii) persons scoring 6+ on 
the disability scale.
Compared with beneﬁ ts for those aged 20-64 the 
situation at age 65+ is more complex due in part 
to beneﬁ t rules and beneﬁ t switches between ages 
60 and 65 and the mixing of people with different 
levels of disability. 
The model overestimates the number of Attendance 
Allowance payments between ages 65 and 75 
and under predicts them at age 80+. However, 
aggregated over all ages and both beneﬁ ts the 
72 Dame Carol Black’s Review of the health of Britain’s working age population ‘Working for a healthier tomorrow’ (2008) Department of Health and 
Department for Work and Pensions.
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model produces similar numbers of people with 
severe disabilities to the number of claimants. 
However, more work is needed to align the beneﬁ ts 
Figure A12
Chart showing the number of DLA and AA payments with age and the number of persons scoring 





































6+ on disability scale
Attendance Allowance payments
 
in payment with the number of disabled in this age 
range.
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Annex G
Impact on beneﬁ ts and state pension costs 
of rises in state pension age
Increases in state pension age (SPA) will potentially 
affect the numbers of people receiving either 
working age long-term sick and disability beneﬁ ts 
or post-retirement age disability beneﬁ ts post-SPA. 
If rules are unchanged it would be expected that 
the number of people taking up pre-SPA beneﬁ ts 
would increase and the number taking up post-SPA 
beneﬁ ts decrease. 
This effect is shown in Figure A13 which plots 
the estimated number of allowances for different 
assumed values of SPA starting at age 20. Points 
A and B denote the number of working age 
allowances in payment at current (joint M&F) 
pension age (about 2.8m) which comprises mainly 
Incapacity Beneﬁ t  and Disability Living Allowance 
and the number of post retirement age allowances  
(1.7m) which comprises Attendance Allowance and 
Disability Living Allowance.
The broad effect of rises in SPA will be to reduce the 
cost of state pensions in payment and increase the 
cost of disability beneﬁ ts as this chart shows. The 
amounts will depend on the value the state pension 
versus the value of the beneﬁ ts in question. Table 
4 in the main text gives some illustrative values of 
this effect for different assumed state pension ages 
between 60 and 70 years. 
Figure A13
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Annex H
Healthy life expectancy (HLE) as a function 
of per capita spending on healthcare
Figure A14 shows the relationship between healthy 
life expectancy (HLE) at birth and expenditure per 
capita on healthcare based on 2003 data (source: 
WHO).  It shows that HLE increases rapidly initially 
up to around $500 after which diminishing returns 
set in. The UK spends around the same as Japan 
which has the highest HLE in the world. The US 
which spends nearly $6000 a year has an HLE 
which is less than in the UK.
Figure A14
The relationship between healthcare spending and HLE for every country in the world based on 
WHO data ($ppp = purchasing power parity)
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Annex I
Trends in life expectancy at age 20 and 65
Figure A15
Trends in life expectancy (M&F) from 1841 to 2003(the steep dip in life expectancy at 20 includes 



























life expectancy at 20 (M&F)
Life expectancy at 65 (M&F)
Until 1880 life expectancy at 20 was around 40 
years, after which it increased apart from during two 
world wars (Figure A15).  An inﬂ uenza pandemic 
contributed to steep falls in 1918-19. By 1960 it was 
increasing at 33 days a year and by 2000 43 days a 
year. Until 1978 the rate of growth in life expectancy 
at age 65 was less than that for 20 year olds, but 
then reached parity in this year at 31 days per year. 
Since then life expectancy among the 65+ has 
advanced further and in 2000 was increasing at 52 
days a year as compared with 43 days a year for 20 
year olds. 
A comparison of changes in life expectancy at 
age 50 between males and females shows some 
important trends. As is seen from Figures A16 and 
A17, life expectancy for males is accelerating faster 
than for females. Although still not as high as for 
females, male higher life expectancy in recent 
decades led us to calculate that current population 
projections for males are being underestimated by 
0.5m in 2020 and by 0.11m for females. Mostly this 
will be concentrated in the age range 70+ for males 
and 80+ for females.
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Figure A16
Graph showing increase in male life expectancy at 50: 1952 to 2001 for England and Wales with 
ﬁ tted regression
Figure A17
Graph showing increase in female life expectancy at 50: 1952 to 2001 for England and Wales 
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Annex J
Social factors associated with work status 
in 50-59 age range
The tables analysed in this annex are called risk 
ladders. They are partitions of the population split 
according to different combinations of ‘risk factors’, 
such as being sick. The purpose of this Annex is to 
analyse factors that are associated with or inﬂ uence 
the decision to work in the age range 50-59 years. 
Using ELSA (English Longitudinal Study of Ageing), 
data on work status were extracted along with 
the following variables: whether (B) educated, (C) 
failed 1+ ADLs, (D) a carer and (E) a home owner. 
Health is measured from ELSA by the failure of 1 or 
more ADLs (activities of daily living). Two additional 
variables were also incorporated: whether a 
smoker, and whether cohabiting. The analysis was 
undertaken separately for males and females.
Males aged 50-59
Table A3 is called a ‘risk ladder’. Each row 
represents a different combination of the four 
variables (B to E) for a sample of 4786 males aged 
50-59. The number of cases in the second column 
shows the sample size of each group and may 
be taken as an indication of their relative size in 
the population as a whole (since ELSA is based 
on a representative sample of older people).  The 
variable combinations are ranked from the group 
with the highest percentage in work (row 1) to the 
group lowest percentage (16). For example in row 2 
with 2067 home-owning males, 92.5% are in work.  
In row 16 with 31 males with 1+ failed ADLs and who 
Table A3
Male risk ladder showing the % in full or part-time work given the risk factors indicted in the 
columns. ‘Y’ indicates that given risk factor applies
      % in full
   C-  E- or part
  B - failed D- home time lower upper
case sample education 1+ADLs carer  owner work CI% CI%
1 5 Y  Y  100.0 54.9 100.0
2 2067    Y 92.5 91.3 93.6
3 954 Y   Y 91.3 89.3 93.0
4 58 Y    89.7 78.8 96.1
5 231     82.7 77.2 87.3
6 123   Y Y 81.3 73.3 87.8
7 97 Y  Y Y 74.2 64.3 82.6
8 202 Y Y  Y 73.3 66.6 79.2
9 26 Y Y Y Y 69.2 48.2 85.7
10 6 Y Y Y  66.7 22.3 95.7
11 575  Y  Y 58.4 54.3 62.5
12 24   Y  54.2 32.8 74.4
13 39 Y Y   48.7 32.4 65.2
14 62  Y Y Y 48.4 35.5 61.4
15 286  Y   28.3 23.2 33.9
16 31  Y Y  22.6 9.6 41.1
total 4786 1387 1227 374 4106 80.7 79.5 81.8
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are carers only 22.6% are in work. Since the sample 
sizes in each risk combination can vary considerably 
95% conﬁ dence intervals are also shown in the ﬁ nal 
two columns.
The overall rate for being in work is 80.7% and 
compares almost exactly with the rate reported in 
the LFS for the same age range, suggesting that 
ELSA is a reliable source for these kinds of data. 
Taken together, the results show that 29% of males 
in this age range are educated (1387/4786), 26% 
have failed 1+ADLs, 7.8% are carers, and 86% are 
home owners.  
The groups with the highest representation in Table 
A3 are educated home owning males (row 2, 2067 
cases 43.2% of sample) and the least represented 
are educated males with caring responsibilities (row 
1, 5 cases 0.1% of sample). 
Regression analysis shows that a man is:
• 1.28 times more likely to be in work if he is 
educated
• 0.14 times if he has failed 1+ ADLs
• 0.45 times if he is a full or part time carer
• 2.87 times he is a home owner.
All variables were statistically signiﬁ cantly different 
from 1 (i.e. no effect) at the 95% conﬁ dence level. 
Smoking status and cohabitation were incorporated 
as part of a bigger model using the same previous 
variables. It was found that a male smoker was 0.7 
times less likely to be in work, but 2.2 times more 
likely to work if cohabiting. 
Females aged 50-59
The analysis was repeated for females. The 
equivalent risk ladder is shown in Table A4. It 
shows that 71.4% of females are in work compared 
with 80.7% of males. The LFS reports that 70% of 
females are in work and so again the results highly 
comparable. In other respects the results tend to be 
broadly similar in terms of risk order. Overall, 21% 
of females are educated, 28% have failed 1+ADLs, 
14% are carers, and 84% are home owners. Working 
status is strongly associated with being a home 
owner. 
Thus a woman is:
• 1.72 times more likely to be in work if educated
• 0.23 times if she has failed 1+ADLs
• 0.81 times if she is a carer
• 2.01 times if a home owner
It is observed that a woman is more likely to juggle 
work and caring responsibilities than a male but 
slightly less likely to work if she is a home owner. 
Unlike males it was found that smoking and 
cohabitation status makes no signiﬁ cant impact on 
work status. 
The results show that the largest group represented 
are healthy, home owning females with no caring 
responsibilities and not educated (row 4, 2452 
cases 41.9% of sample). The least represented 
are unhealthy educated females with caring 
responsibilities (row 11, 9 cases 0.2% of sample).
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Table A4
Equivalent risk ladder for females
      % in full
   C-  E- or part
  B - failed D- home time lower upper
case sample education 1+ADLs carer  owner work CI% CI%
1 13 Y  Y  100.0 79.4 100.0
2 782 Y   Y 85.8 83.2 88.2
3 116 Y  Y Y 81.9 73.7 88.4
4 2452    Y 81.5 79.9 83.0
5 53 Y    79.2 65.9 89.2
6 354     76.6 71.8 80.9
7 378   Y Y 74.3 69.6 78.7
8 213 Y Y  Y 70.9 64.3 76.9
9 36 Y Y Y Y 66.7 49.0 81.4
10 71   Y  60.6 48.3 72.0
11 9 Y Y Y  55.6 21.2 86.3
12 137  Y Y Y 51.8 43.1 60.4
13 775  Y  Y 50.5 46.9 54.0
14 35 Y Y   42.9 26.3 60.6
15 59  Y Y  32.2 20.6 45.6
16 367  Y   24.3 20.0 29.0
total 5850 1257 1631 819 4889 71.4 70.3 72.6
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Annex K
Individualised tables of ‘Life Balance Index’
The tables in this annex show results based on the 
Life Balance index for people in different situations 
at age 50. The partitioning variables are educational 
level, whether in a job at age 50, whether cohabiting 
or healthy. Separate results are presented formales 
and females. The value of the index ranges from 








   e
h








Where el life expectancy at 50, eh healthy life 
expectancy,  and e
w
 working life expectancy. Thus 
the index equals one when el  equals eh which 
equals e
w
  i.e. life expectancy (LE) is the same 
as healthy life expectancy (HLE) and working life 
expectancy (WLE). HLE is assumed to be greater 
than or equal to WLE so that WLE cannot be positive 
if HLE is zero. The index is designed to capture the 
lifetime fulﬁ lment and contribution of an individual 
measured in these terms. 
Tables A5 and A6 list values of the index for males 
and females in descending order of magnitude. 
Thus in row 1 one of Table A5 the group with the 
highest index value of 0.39 are males in educational 
level one, who are working and cohabiting and 
healthy at age 50. They comprise 13% of the sample 
population. It is noteworthy that the ﬁ rst 13 rows 
are groups that are all in work and that the ﬁ rst 8 
rows are groups that report good health. Those with 
the lowest index values are associated with low 
educational attainment, were not working at 50, not 
cohabiting and reporting poor health. 
Similar ﬁ ndings are reported for females but 
because they are more likely to take time out of the 
labour market than males their index values are 
lower. Thus the highest ranked female group with 
an index of 0.27 is in educational level 1, is in work 
at age 50, is cohabiting and is healthy. This group 
comprises 8.4% of the sample. Numerically the 
largest male and female groups are all in the top 5 
in the rankings. These groups account for 68.7% of 
all males and 54% of all females. 
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Table A5 
Life balance index for males based on life expectancy, healthy life expectancy and 
working life expectancy at age 50
   working   healthy   
 % of  educational at cohabiting  at age LE HLE WLE Index
males population level age 50 at age 50 50 (years) (years) (years) value
1 13.0 1 Y Y Y 38.2 31.6 18.0 0.39
2 24.2 2 Y Y Y 34.7 28.4 15.3 0.36
3 18.9 3 Y Y Y 34.9 27.7 15.4 0.35
4 0.9 1 Y  Y 38.0 27.1 17.8 0.33
5 11.7 4 Y Y Y 31.6 24.5 13.3 0.33
6 0.6 2 Y  Y 34.1 24.1 15.1 0.31
7 2.0 3 Y  Y 34.6 23.4 15.3 0.30
8 1.0 4 Y  Y 31.3 20.3 13.0 0.27
9 2.9 1 Y Y  32.2 18.4 14.3 0.25
10 3.4 2 Y Y  28.8 16.0 11.8 0.23
11 4.2 3 Y Y  29.0 15.2 11.9 0.21
12 2.1 4 Y Y  26.1 12.8 9.8 0.18
13 0.2 1 Y   34.4 16.3 13.0 0.18
14 1.1 1  Y Y 36.9 28.8 7.8 0.17
15 0.4 2 Y   30.7 13.6 10.4 0.15
16 0.1 3 Y   31.1 13.0 10.5 0.14
17 1.3 2  Y Y 33.3 25.7 5.6 0.13
18 1.5 3  Y Y 33.6 25.1 5.7 0.13
19 0.1 4 Y   27.9 10.5 8.4 0.11
20 1.9 4  Y Y 30.3 22.0 4.1 0.10
21 0.2 1   Y 33.8 20.5 5.3 0.10
22 0.4 1  Y  32.4 16.8 5.9 0.09
23 1.2 2   Y 30.0 18.0 3.5 0.07
24 0.7 2  Y  28.9 14.4 3.9 0.07
25 1.2 3   Y 30.4 17.3 3.6 0.07
26 0.5 3  Y  29.1 13.6 4.1 0.07
27 0.0 1    29.5 11.0 4.5 0.06
28 1.7 4   Y 27.4 14.9 2.4 0.05
29 0.6 4  Y  26.0 11.3 2.7 0.05
30 0.5 2    25.8 9.2 2.9 0.04
31 0.4 3    26.1 8.4 2.9 0.04
32 1.2 4    23.1 6.5 1.8 0.02
total %  
or 
average 100.0 2.5 85.7 88.3 82.5 33.4 24.9 13.4 0.30
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Table A6
Life balance index for females based on healthy life expectancy and working life expectancy 
at age 50
   working   healthy   
 % of  educational at cohabiting  at age LE HLE WLE Index
females population level age 50 at age 50 50 (years) (years) (years) value
1 8.4 1 Y Y Y 39.9 29.1 14.8 0.27
2 12.7 2 Y Y Y 38.8 28.2 12.9 0.24
3 22.1 3 Y Y Y 38.6 28.0 12.6 0.24
4 9.8 4 Y Y Y 36.2 25.4 10.9 0.21
5 1.0 1 Y  Y 39.7 21.8 13.6 0.19
6 2.9 1 Y Y  34.2 17.0 12.8 0.19
7 1.3 2 Y  Y 38.6 21.0 11.8 0.17
8 1.6 3 Y  Y 38.5 20.9 11.5 0.16
9 3.6 2 Y Y  33.2 16.2 10.9 0.16
10 6.0 3 Y Y  32.9 16.0 10.6 0.16
11 1.9 4 Y  Y 35.9 18.6 9.8 0.14
12 3.5 4 Y Y  30.5 14.0 8.9 0.13
13 0.5 1 Y   39.1 14.1 12.1 0.11
14 0.3 2 Y   38.1 13.4 10.3 0.10
15 1.6 1  Y Y 41.1 29.4 5.5 0.10
16 0.6 3 Y   37.7 13.3 10.0 0.09
17 0.5 4 Y   35.5 11.5 8.4 0.08
18 1.5 2  Y Y 39.8 28.4 4.1 0.07
19 4.3 3  Y Y 39.6 28.2 3.8 0.07
20 4.0 4  Y Y 37.2 25.8 2.8 0.05
21 0.2 1  Y  37.4 16.8 4.3 0.05
22 0.3 1   Y 36.5 17.5 3.9 0.05
23 0.6 2  Y  36.4 16.2 3.2 0.04
24 0.9 2   Y 35.5 16.8 2.8 0.04
25 2.0 3   Y 35.2 16.6 2.6 0.04
26 0.9 3  Y  36.2 16.0 2.9 0.04
27 3.4 4   Y 32.9 15.1 1.9 0.03
28 1.3 4  Y  33.8 14.1 2.1 0.03
29 0.2 1    32.3 8.4 3.0 0.02
30 0.3 2    31.3 8.1 2.1 0.02
31 0.5 3    30.9 7.9 2.0 0.02
32 1.3 4    28.9 6.8 1.3 0.01
total %  
or 
average 100.0 2.7 76.78 83.2 76.71 37.8 24.0 11.4 0.19
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Annex L
Changes in average weekly earnings
This Annex considers recent changes in average 
earnings by age in order to test the hypothesis of 
whether there are differential shifts by age between 
1997 and 2008. The data used combine males and 
females and so the patterns will differ slightly in the 
detail if analysed separately. 
Figure A18 shows the typical pattern of the earnings 
cycle with average weekly earnings increasing 
and peaking in the 40s before declining. Analysis 
indicates that the age at which earnings peak has 
changed from 43.7 to 44 .3 years over the period. 
Figure A19 shows percentage changes in weekly 
earnings by age. If relative earnings were unchanged 
the curve would be ﬂ at; in fact its shows that 
earnings for younger workers have increased more 
slowly than earnings for those aged 35+.  
Between 35 and 50 the curve ﬂ attens but there is 
some evidence for higher percentage increases 
at age 50+, but more years of data are needed to 
establish a ﬁ rm trend. 
Figure A18
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Annex M
Beneﬁ t replacement rates – two examples
The UK social security system is highly complex; 
as far as households with one or more disabled 
persons is concerned a distinction can be drawn 
between households that do not qualify for means 
tested beneﬁ ts and those that do. In the ﬁ rst case 
persons may be eligible for Incapacity Beneﬁ t/
Severe Disablement Allowance and/or for Disability 
Living Allowance, the main disability beneﬁ ts even 
if household income is above the relevant means 
tested threshold.  
For households below the threshold and not in work 
the DWP produces tax beneﬁ t tables for households 
of different types (but not all types). Included in the 
tables is the beneﬁ t replacement rate – deﬁ ned as 
the ratio of the amount of money a person would 
earn in work for different levels of weekly income 
(including tax credits that are due for people on low 
income) versus what they would receive on means 
tested beneﬁ ts after housing costs. 
Since we are mainly interested in 50+ households it 
is assumed they will not have dependent children, 
although further examples could be constructed 
on this basis. In these cases households will also 
receive working tax credit, child tax credit and 
other beneﬁ ts such as child care, and so beneﬁ t 
replacement rates will tend to be lower; i.e. it may 
pay better to be in work. 
The following two examples show the replacement 
rates at different levels of income for two types of 
household in which there are no children and there 
is entitlement to a disability premium73:
1. a single person households age > 25 years who is 
an local authority tenant and receives the single 
person disability premium
2. a married couple household age >25 who are 
local authority tenants, who receive the couple 
disability premium
Figure A20 shows beneﬁ t replacement rates against 
gross weekly income. Superimposed are four levels 
of weekly earnings: A, a single person working 
40 hours based on the minimum wage of £5.37 
per hour; B, what a couple would earn both in 
work based on the minimum wage; C, the average 
73 There are different levels of premium. To qualify one needs to qualify for Incapacity Beneﬁ t/ Severe disability Allowance or Disability Living Allowance. 
The standard premium is £25.85 a week and £36.85 for a couple. Enhanced premiums are also possible.
Figure A20
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weekly earnings for a woman age 50 in 2008; D, the 
average weekly earnings for a man aged 50 in 2008. 
The results show that a single person (A) who 
qualiﬁ es for incapacity beneﬁ t would receive about 
70% of what he/she would earn in work before 
commuting and other work related costs based on 
the minimum wage; (B), a couple would receive 
about 60% based on both working at the minimum 
wage. 
If only one worked at the minimum wage in a couple 
household the graph shows they would be better 
off on beneﬁ ts. At the average levels of earnings, 
C and D, the replacement rates are under 50% in a 
couple household if a woman is the only earner, and 
around 30% if a man is the only earner. If both earn 
the average wage the beneﬁ t replacement rates fall 
to below 20%. 
A further important consideration apart from the 
beneﬁ t to wage ratio is the nature of the work; if low 
paid, casual and short term an individual could be 
better advised to stay on beneﬁ ts because of the 
effects of beneﬁ t qualifying rules, administrative 
time lags to re-apply for beneﬁ ts and for cash ﬂ ow 
reasons. The examples appear to suggest therefore 
that work incentives for people in such types of 
household are very low.
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Annex N
Simple economic model
Consider a situation in society in which the working 
age population crudely divides into two groups 
consisting of either healthy or unhealthy people.  
The unhealthy group does not work and receive 
ﬁ nancial support from the state or they are retired 
and receive a pension plus additional ﬁ nancial 
support for their disability.
The healthy lives are divided into those of working 
age and those who are retired.  Those of working 
age will either work (and receive a wage) or are 
economically inactive (and received no beneﬁ t 
under this model); those who are retired receive 
only the basic pension. The economically inactive 
population is in caring roles, unpaid work, full time 
education or simply in leisure.
Without loss of generality we focus on the 
population aged 20+ and deﬁ ne the following 
quantities (all values calculated at the same point in 
time): 
el = expected total life
e
w




 = expected retired life (alive and over state   
 pension age)
ehw = expected healthy working life
ehr = expected healthy retired life
eh = healthy life expectancy
We observe the following identities:
el = ew + er   




expected healthy working life + expected 
unhealthy working life + expected healthy retired 
life + expected unhealthy retired life
Other quantities of interest are the proportion of 
sick and disabled in the stable population and the 







d = ---------------- 










Where el - eh equals the expected years in disability 
Assume that when in the status of ‘ill or disabled’ 
people cannot work. Further, assume that beneﬁ t 
payments received is the value of beneﬁ ts and care 
received. Deﬁ ne the following:
a =  participation rate (% of healthy lives of 
 working age that work)
w =  average wage
p =  pension
b
w




 = sickness beneﬁ t paid to people of retired age  
 in addition to pension
Individual level
We can consider the average individual aged 20 and 
get the following results (assuming no inﬂ ation) for 
the lifetime wages earned and beneﬁ ts received:
i)  total wage: w
sum
 = ehwaw    





 – ehw)bw   




p   
iv) total additional beneﬁ t received when retired 




 – ehr)br  
Assuming no investment return, then the tax rate t 
needed for the individual to be ‘self supporting’, i.e. 
they pay sufﬁ cient tax when working to pay for their 
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t = ---------------------------------------- 




If we assume that the population is stable, i.e. 
stationary with constant births and deaths, then 
we can simply calculate aggregated values for the 









Where P20 is the population age 20+
Total aggregated wage is then: w
sum
f   




Total pension paid to population of retired age is:
p
wsum
f   
Total additional beneﬁ t paid to retired population 
who are ill is: bfsum f  
Then assuming that beneﬁ ts are paid on a PAYG 
(Pay As You Go) basis (i.e. no surplus fund is built 














t = ----------------------------------------------- + -----------------------------------------
          
w
sum
f                                w
sum
i.e. the same as the individual rate.
For large periods one or more of these values will 
be constant.  For example, if we assume no changes 





  are constant.  If we increase 
life expectancy in old age but keep the number of 





. The beneﬁ t of this model is that by 
isolating the constituent parts one can see the true 
effect of increasing only one of the variables.  
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Assuming GDP can be represented by total wages 
then






               
e
l
               
 and GDP per capita by:
        
GDP       e
hw          
g = --------------  =   -------   aw   
        
P
20+
         e
1
                   
This states that the GDP per capita is equal to the 
proportion of the population that is healthy and of 
working age multiplied by the percentage of this 
potential working population who actually work 
multiplied by the average wage.  Therefore GDP per 
capita increases if the:
• proportion of population that is classed as 
working age increases i.e. if state pension age is 
increased 
• proportion of population of working age that is 
healthy increases 
• proportion of healthy working age that work 
increases
• average wage increases (as this is the proxy of 
GDP)
Table A7 shows the values of the input variables 
used to generate the scenarios in the main text. 
Table A8 shows the impact of a given change in any 
input variable on GDP, GDP/capita and the tax rate 
whilst holding the other variables constant. Wages 
at base line are set at £23k p.a.; pensions at £5k 
p.a.; other beneﬁ ts (social security, health) at 
£10k p.a.
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Table A7
Table of expectancies used in scenarios in text
       years of years in  years of
        life  retirement working
       spent in in ill age in ill 
scenario e1 eh ew er ehw ehr disability health health
base 60 50 40 20 37 13 10 7 3
1 63 49 40 23 36 13 14 10 4
2 63 52 40 23 38 14 11 9 2
3 63 53 40 23 38 15 10 8 2
4 63 54 40 23 38 16 9 7 2
5 66 55 41 25 39 16 11 9 2
6 66 56 41 25 39 17 10 8 2
Table A8
Table showing impacts of a 1 year or 1% increase in the model variables
                                                                            effect of a +1yr or 1%  change
quantity GDP GDP/capita tax rate%
el  -1.6 -1.6 6.0
e
w
  0.0 0.0 0.6
e
r
  0.0 0.0 -0.6
ehw  2.7 2.7 -6.3
ehr  -2.7 -2.7 6.7
ek  1.4 1.4 -5.7
a (+1%) 1.6 1.6 -1.5
w (+1%) 1.0 1.0 -1.0
p (+1%) 0.0 0.0 0.6
b
r
 (+1%) 0.0 0.0 0.2
b
w
 (+1%) 0.0 0.0 0.2
P20 + (+1%) 5.0 0.0 0.0
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1) Demographic trends and impact on key social 
and economic variables
• population ageing (including accuracy of 
current ONS projections)
• dependency ratios 
• healthy to unhealthy support ratios
• changes in the gap between LE and HLE 
• longevity at different ages including oldest 
old
• immigration  
• cohort effects (e.g. are younger people as 
healthy at the same stage of life as their 
parents)
• labour participation rates 
1b) Summarise impact of these trends on key 
economic and social outcomes, including:
• economic outcomes
- welfare beneﬁ t expenditure
- public service expenditure
- tax revenue
- labour market productivity
- GDP growth/ economic output
- GDP per capita growth  
• social outcomes
- numbers in poor health
- numbers requiring social care
- numbers of carers required 
- health inequalities
2a) Assess policy levers that might be available 
to modify ‘adverse’ trends over the medium 
term.  Of particular interest are levers that can 
inﬂ uence 
• (economic) participation rates, such as
- default retirement age
- state pension age
- beneﬁ ts and tax policy
• healthy life expectancy , such as
- regulatory health measures (e.g. at work, 
in the home, in school, smoking cessation)
-  health policies aimed at lifestyles 
(awareness, access to advice)
Key to assessing the policy levers that work will be 
pinpointing underlying drivers, such as 
• for (economic) participation rates 
- employment policies (job ﬁ nding, job 
creation, ﬂ exible working, carers)
- education and retraining (long-term 
unemployed, carers returning to work)
• for health life expectancy:
- social and medical factors – employment, 
cohabitation, education, better treatments, 
physical exercise (opportunities), over the 
life span
- behavioural and social factors  - e.g. 
smoking, mental illness, obesity, poverty 
gap, inequalities in wealth/income 
(barriers)
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